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Abstract 
 
Due to the introduction of new technology on the bridge, the navigator’s working 
environment and navigational tools have changed. In this dissertation, several safety 
issues related to the application of hi-tech equipment have been discussed. In order to 
provide an alternative in the event of failure of hi-tech equipment the importance of 
traditional navigational skills has been restated.  
 
All SOLAS ships are supposed to have been fitted with AIS by 1 July 2004 in an 
accelerated schedule due to the events of “9/11”. With little knowledge of AIS’s 
capabilities and limitations on collision avoidance and situation awareness, 
navigators have to use AISs to improve safety. This has brought deep safety concerns 
related to watch keeping and collision avoidance. Several potential risks of using AIS 
have been discussed in the paper. 
 
Currently there are no relevant IMO conventions, regulations, resolutions, and 
guidelines that directly stress AIS training. However there are certain provisions in 
some instruments that indirectly refer to AIS training. The importance of faithful 
interpretation of these provisions has been stated to develop an effective AIS training 
syllabus and to organize efficient AIS training both on board and on shore.  
 
The limitation of current AIS training, which is current carried out on board mainly 
by self-study with a manufacturer-provided CD, has been examined. Also, on shore 
training has been discussed and its limitations are defined. At the end of this paper, 
recommendations and an AIS training syllabus are proposed. 
 
Key Words:  AIS  IBS  ECDIS  MKD  GPS  OOW  Collision  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
In the Foreword to Third Edition of Training and Assessment on Board, the former 
Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, W.A. O’Neil  (2002) 
emphasised that: 
“At the present time the technology of shipping is changing very rapidly 
and it is important that education and training keep pace with the 
changes. Traditional skills and experience of today’s seafarers shall pass 
on to the next generation, while at the same time they shall be properly 
trained to use new technology as it is introduced. This will need to take 
place not only through lectures in classrooms and training centers 
ashore but also on board ship.” 
 
In light of O’Neil comments, the principle purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
how traditional navigational skills should be looked at when new technology is being 
introduced on ship bridge, how Automatic Identification System (AIS) training 
should be organized and what should be included in AIS training syllabus. 
1.1 Importance of the Study 
 
Integrated Bridge System (IBS) on modern ship bridge has gradually replaced 
previously isolated installed electronic equipment on traditional ship bridge. 
Consequently, working environment and navigational tools have changed. It is 
necessary to examine certain impacts of application of high-tech equipment on ship 
safety, especially on collision avoidance and situation awareness.  
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Recently AIS has been frequently targeted for safety concerns. AIS has been 
developed as an information providing system to help identify ships and assist in 
tracking targets, as well as enhance situation awareness. The events of “9/11” has 
made the original IMO AIS carriage-fitting timetable considerably short. On 1st July 
2004, all SOLAS ships have been equipped with AISs. The accelerated AIS 
installation schedule has left AIS training far behind. Without properly understanding 
the limitations and capabilities, the navigators are expected to use the AIS for safety 
of navigation & ship identification. From shore training point of view, not only does 
competent training mean that trainees should be trained for the basic operation of 
AIS, but they also need to fully understand AIS’s pros and cons. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine AIS’s capabilities and limitations for collision avoidance and 
situation awareness. Meanwhile, technical contents itself is not enough to develop an 
effective AIS training syllabus. Without proper guidance of relevant regulations, the 
AIS training syllabuses can be substantially different form one training center to 
another. Therefore it is difficult to assess the competency of trainees. This might be 
also true for on board training of AIS.  
 
On the other hand, technology is changing faster than the development of relevant 
regulations. There is not a single legal instrument that directly stress AIS training. 
However there are some legal instruments that indirectly reflect AIS training. The 
fact is that using AIS to assist in collision avoidance and situation awareness will 
affect the implementation of certain provisions in COLREGs, especially when AIS 
has been integrated with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS. Certain technical provisions in 
STCW code have been involved too. AIS application also interacts with VTS traffic 
control and information exchange, coastal management, as well as even further for 
anti-terrorism measures. Therefore, it is essential to examine which fundamental 
requirements of AIS application are implicated in relevant conventions as well as 
other legal instruments. Those requirements will guide how AIS should be operated, 
and furthermore, to instruct how AIS training should be organized and what contents 
should be included in an AIS training syllabus. 
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Finally, the study will be used as a reference to develop an AIS training program in 
the author’s organization, Dalian Maritime University. The trainees will be existing 
deck officers and seafaring students in that University. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
(1) To examine challenges of new technology on a ship’s bridge; 
(2) To define current safety issues triggered by AIS; 
(3) To discus advantages and limitations of using AIS on board ships; 
(4) To define limitations of current AIS training; 
(5) To identify how AIS training should be organized; 
(6) To develop an effective AIS training syllabus. 
1.3 Order of Presentation 
 
The order of presentation is arranged in a logical sequence to focus and attain the 
desired objectives of this dissertation. In Chapter II, challenges resulting from new 
technology on bridge will be discussed. IBS can provide a navigator for quick and 
accurate information, however it induces the navigator to be over-reliant on IBS. In 
addition, working with IBS may result in the navigator loosing the traditional 
navigational skill and the “feel” of situations around the ship. Furthermore, 
information flow chart may be changed unconsciously.  As a member of IBS, not 
only has AIS all the above features but it also has its unique challenges to the 
navigator. 
 
By 1 July 2004, all SOLAS ships have to be fitted with AIS. The safety issues are of 
much concern. Chapter III will examine several AIS triggered safety issues. This 
chapter will focus on carriage requirements of AIS by relevant regulations; types of 
AIS; non-AIS ships; connecting problems of AIS; AIS impacts on detection of 
collision Risks; AIS training issues; integrations of AIS with IBS. 
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To know well about the advantages and limitations of using AIS on board is key to 
developing an effective AIS training syllabus. In Chapter IV, the advantages and 
limitations of AIS will be discussed. This chapter mainly deals with AIS merits in 
managing collision avoidance and deficiencies related to safety.  Several risks related 
to using AIS in collision avoidance will be examined and evaluated, such as issue of 
COLREGs violation by vessels during collision avoidance manoeuvres; risk to small 
boats; Inaccuracy of AIS information; risk by poorly located AIS display units; 
switching off AIS.  
 
Analysis of Limitations of current AIS training, both on-board and on-shore, will 
provide a basis to improve the competency of AIS training. Chapter V focuses on the 
drawbacks of AIS training. Existing legal instruments will be examined to find 
implicated requirements of AIS training. Certain provisions of SOLAS, COLREGs, 
STCW and IMO resolutions are carefully studied. Meanwhile, current situation of 
AIS installation on bridge is discussed as guidance for training objectives. Current 
situations of AIS training both on board and on shore are examined to find their 
limitations. The study provides a road map to improve effectiveness of existing AIS 
training.  
 
The issues of how an effective AIS training could be organized is discussed in 
Chapter VI. Experience of GMDSS training is used as a reference to propose a well-
organized AIS training. Training for using both MKD AIS and integrated AIS is 
proposed. Key elements of what should comprise the in an effective syllabus are 
listed. Certain issues of on board ASI training are also discussed.  
 
In the final chapter, based on the study of this dissertation, several safety issues 
related to new technology, especially to AIS, have been included. These conclusions 
can be referred to develop a company safety policy, on board AIS training 
procedures and activities, safety culture establishment. Meanwhile, several 
recommendations have been given with regard to how both on shore and on board 
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AIS training should be organized. An AIS training syllabus has been proposed for 
training centers to refer to develop individual training programs.     
 
1.4 Scope and methodology 
 
Contact was made with a few AIS technical experts who have provided important 
technical materials to contribute the study. A literature search was extensively 
undertaken to examine what findings have been got by current AIS trails and other 
research. Some visiting and resident experts in the field at the World Maritime 
University were interviewed to seek their opinion and advice.  IMO relevant 
resolutions, AIS trail reports and AIS related papers, as well as some AIS-related 
proposals submitted by IMO Party States during IMO Subcommittees’ meetings 
were collected and examined to support the study.  The author also used his personal 
experience as a deck officer and as a GMDSS training officer. This experience 
helped to identify main issues relevant to the objectives of the research.  
 
During the field trip to Germany, the author has been on board two Ro-Ro ferries and 
interviewed duty officers for seeking their opinion and perspectives on AIS 
application. The author also has got an opportunity to view how AIS works on board. 
This experience has greatly benefited this study.  
  
In order to achieve the goals of this paper, the author has examined 4 high-tech 
assisted marine accidents and air clash disasters. Meanwhile potential risks caused by 
the introduction of new technologies on bridge have been discussed. Therefore the 
study will contribute to find out why traditional navigational skills are important to 
be used as back-up measures to ensure the safety in event of failure of positioning 
equipment in IBS, such as GPS, AIS etc.  
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Chapter II     
 
Recent Technological Challenges on a Ship’s Bridge 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
On the bridge of modern ships technological change can be found everywhere. Two 
decades ago, isolated installed electronic equipment was the featured layout of the 
traditional bridge. Today, post-isolated installed electronic equipment has been integrated 
into an E-Shaped IBS. With IBS, navigators are more inclined to interpret the 
information shown on a screen for decision making and less by visual observation 
themselves; navigators having got benefited from this. However, there are some 
potential risks with IBS; the latest technology-AIS has been introduced on the bridge 
and the carriage of an AIS for all SOLAS ships has became mandatory. Using AIS 
effectively is another challenge. 
 
2.2 Changes of Technology on Bridge  
 
An IBS consists of an integrated navigation system (INS), integrated control system 
(ICS), individual steering and propulsion controls, machinery monitoring, fire 
detection, cargo control etc. Engineers intend to separate IBS into two parts, i.e. INS, 
which is used by a navigator for navigating and conning the vessel, and a technical 
management system, which can be considered as a totally separate system.  
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According to the IEC, IBS is:  
Any combination of systems that are interconnected in order to allow 
centralized access to sensor information or command /control from 
workstations to perform two or more of the following operations: passage 
execution; communications; machinery control; loading, discharging and 
cargo control; safety and security. Management operation may also be 
performed within the IBS.  (Fairplay Solutions, 1999, p.25)  
 
In contrast, Mr. Alastair Messer, a surveyor in LR’s control engineering department, 
defines INS as a combination of systems that are interconnected to increase safe and 
efficient operation navigation by suitably qualified personnel and would typically 
include GPS, radar, chart, etc. He further summarizes that INS is specific, whereas 
IBS is generic (Fairplay Solutions, 1999, p.25). STN ATLAS (2004) includes a 
diagram to show the relationship between INS and IBS. See Appendix V. 
 
New technology applied in IBS has vastly improved situational awareness for bridge 
decision-makers simply because of accelerated information processing and superior 
displays (Luniewski, 1999, p.41). Over the past several decades, a navigator has been 
busy in fixing ship’s positions mainly by GPS and Radar observations, especially 
during sailing in narrow waters, heavy-density traffic zones and shallow water areas 
etc. Today, ships have become bigger and faster. The faster the ship the more 
nervous a navigator may become, simply because it sails further than a slower one in 
the same period of time. For example, a traditional ship, which has a speed of 15 
knots, can only make 1.25 nautical miles in 5 minutes, while a container ship with a 
speed of 25 knots can sail 2 nautical miles in 5 minutes. Some captains require 
navigators to present a ship’s position in shorter intervals than 5 minutes. One can 
imagine how heavy the workload is for the navigator. Fortunately, the situation is 
different on today’s bridge, on which IBS releases a heavy workload in certain 
aspects. With IBS, a junior officer can only stand in front of a screen on which 
information from different sources can be shown in one.  
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Luniewski (1999, p.42) explains that this is a revolutionary shift from the days of 
manoeuvring on board, grease pencil CPAs and three-minute fixes. Information 
presentation on the modern bridge allows navigators to execute, at a glance, the data 
collection and collation functions. 
 
The Electronic Nautical Chart (ENC) can provide a navigator an accurate visual 
position. He/she can “see” where ships are and where ships are going as well as 
where ships will sail in 3 or 5 minutes. The track on ENC presents a navigator with 
visual routes that the ships have followed at an earlier stage. Therefore there is a 
dynamic presentation of a ship’s track and a navigator can easily find out if the ship 
is sailing according to the passage plan. Hence, a navigator is released from the 
heavy task of paper chart working, not only position fixing but also passage 
preparation. 
 
The fixes shown on the ENC can be accurate within a few meters and is updated 
every 15 seconds. Real-time position presentation on ENC with frequent position 
updates allows a navigator to be well aware of his/her surroundings. In addition, the 
ENC can show an electronic "voyage plan" which provides navigators with turn 
recommendations, compensating course recommendations to correct for set and drift 
and other elements. One can conclude that these features will greatly ease the burden 
of a navigator and minimize human error.  
 
Luniwwski (1999, p.44) adds: 
Compared with paper charts, which are considered the most labour-
intensive task, ECDIS automated chart management capabilities will 
achieve large savings in man power and increased safety. On-line 
correction or CD correction will greatly ease heavy burden of officers to 
correct paper charts from printed and broadcast Notices to Mariners. 
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2.3 Disadvantages of IBS  
 
“It is on men that safety at sea depends and they cannot make a greater 
mistake than to suppose that machines can do all their work for them”  
(Justice Cairns, in the English Admiralty Court, 1967) 
 
2.3.1 Risks of Over-reliance on IBS 
IBS processes data much quicker and provides information more accurately than 
the old systems. Therefore a navigator may become over-reliant on the system and 
gradually lose the capability to detect any false information when the system goes 
wrong. The system can provide navigators with what they want to support decision 
making in a much quicker and more accurate way. Therefore, they are going to 
trust the system and become more and more dependent on it. In other words, they 
just simply trust what the system provides. However, when suddenly something 
goes wrong, it is very difficult for navigators to quickly recognize what has gone 
wrong, or if they know what has gone wrong, they do not exactly know why it has 
gone wrong, because what they see day-by-day is the result of computer processed 
data, and they are not involved in the process to work out the result. Therefore they 
lack the ability to track the problem from the result back to the process and, in turn 
to the origin of problem.  
 
The report of the investigation of the TRANSIT Flight 238 accident shows that the 
parameters shown in the meters on the information board indicate something wrong 
in the fuel tanks, but the parameters can not lead pilot to recognize there was a leak 
of oil. In other words, a pilot could not imagine there was a leak of fuel oil by 
interpreting the parameters in the meters of the fuel oil tanks (Discovery Channel, 
25th April 2004).  
 
Although there is more time for a navigator on board ship to interpret problem-
related parameters than on board an airplane, less practice makes the navigator lose 
the ability to anticipate problems and interpret problem-related parameters.  
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The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released a report of the 
investigation into the ROYAL MAJESTY’s grounding, which occurred in 1995. 
The report shows that a navigator was of over-reliance on the automated features of 
the IBS, and had insufficient training in the technical capabilities and limitations of 
the system. He also had poor practice in watch keeping with new technologies. 
Some specific factors that contributed to the accident are: the echo sounder alarm 
had been set to zero depth; the navigator had inefficient monitoring of the status of 
the GPS and had no cross-checking of the GPS derived positions (NTSB, 2004).  
 
Cross-checking of the GPS derived positions with other positioning instruments 
needs to be emphasized. A navigator should be aware that over-reliance on the new 
technology is a risk.  
 
Additional training is needed to make navigators adapt to the use of new 
technology and to know new technology’s capabilities and limitations. To interpret 
information and use this to increase safety is important. 
 
2.3.2 Loss of Traditional Navigational Skills  
Traditional navigational skills (TNS) have been developed over centuries. These 
skills are condensed professional skills that have been passed down from 
predecessors and they are definitely important in sailing a ship safely at that time. 
The young generation today faces both traditional navigational skills and modern 
technology-based computerization. There is a choice that either people use only 
new technology or both. Currently it is easy to say that seafarers need both because 
they still have the opportunity to work on traditional ships. In the future, will 
people still need traditional navigational skills? There should be more research into 
this issue. Young cadets will argue that what they learn in school is not useful on 
board because the skills are out of date and not adapted to IBS. Furthermore, 
computers can manage many of those tasks. Therefore cadets may think it is a 
Chapter II                               Recent Technological Challenges on a Ship’s Bridge  
 11
waste of their time to learn such old skills that will never be used and the training 
syllabus should be changed to reflect the needs of the new technology.  
 
However, most important is to be aware that the system is not designed to manage 
everything. What the system does is to calculate, monitor, control, such as ETA, 
passage plan, cargo operation etc. It is designed to help a navigator but not to replace 
him/her. In other words, the system is a tool, an aid, but not a new brain. Being 
aware of this is important for safety. A Captain should be aware that navigators, 
rather than systems, must carry out necessary functions. 
 
Navigators have known that just before the year 2000, the Y2K problem was a hot 
issue. Scientists had anticipated it might cause a lot of problems to computer 
systems on board ships. Navigators were taking celestial fixes to prepare for the 
sudden failure of GPS. Since then, navigators have become to realize that 
traditional navigational skills are still useful. Today, these skills should be used to 
do crosschecking. Therefore, in the case of a GPS failure, navigators should still be 
able to make a celestial fix. In addition, the Loran-C system, which is a backup 
system of GPS, can be used to fix a ship positions in the event of a GPS failure. 
Therefore, traditional navigational skills (TNS) should be passed on to the younger 
generation. The more TNS they have, the stronger ability they will have to handle 
technical problems and anticipate system failures. 
 
2.3.3 Lost “Feel” for Situations 
A navigator can easily lose the “feel” of a situation when working with IBS. The 
traditional duties of a navigator make him or her know the ship’s positions well. 
Every 30-minute GPS or Radar fix on the chart makes the navigator aware of the 
surroundings. Therefore the navigator will instinctively check if the ship is keeping 
to the plan. No doubt, this procedure will benefit safety. Furthermore, during this 
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well accepted process, a navigator’s capability of controlling, monitoring, and 
observing has been maintained and even more built up step-by-step. However, 
computers can do what the navigator was supposed to do before. An accurate GPS 
position is shown on an electronic chart every 6 minutes, including various vectors 
or data related to a ships' maneuvering. Even better, overhead presentations with 
large figures show all the information necessary for decision making. Meanwhile, a 
Captain does not have to ask a junior officer for information. The Captain simply 
glances at the screen and knows what information they want to get. Then, they do 
what is needed with a little push or pull. Finally the ship drives itself according to 
the Captain’s orders. 
 
gardnews (1999, p.11) identified that bridge automation takes the responsibility 
away from the individual and this can lead to boredom, daydreaming, monotony 
and a lack of stimulation. There is no need for celestial fixing and no need for 30-
minute GPS positioning on charts. This feature contributes less busy times, 
especially when vessels are in the deep sea. Not being able to converse with a 
fellow human being for a long time might make officers less sensitive to certain 
surroundings and it is easy for the mind to wander.  
 
2.4 The Introduction of AIS into the Ship’s Bridge  
 
IALA has presented the first proposal of AIS to IMO. The initiative of IALA to 
develop AIS is to identify Radar targets within the VTS coverage, since VTS 
operators have problems in identifying Radar targets. However, the potential of AIS 
to benefit ship maneuvering has been quickly recognized and AIS has begun to be 
introduced on ships.  
 
AIS is a ship and shore based broadcast system, operating in the VHF maritime band. 
It will provide a series of other ship’s information for navigators, i.e. ship’s name, 
call sign, bearing and distance, size and draft of ships, port of destination, the change 
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in a ship’s heading, course/speed over ground, rate of turn, etc. Some of this 
information is important to ship safety.  
 
According to IMO Resolution A.917(22), AIS has been introduced to help identify 
ships; assist in target tracking; simplify information exchange; and provide additional 
information to assist situation awareness (IMO, 2002b). Appendix I shows an 
overview of the AIS system and its components.  
 
The original IMO timetable requires all SOLAS ships to be fitted with AIS no later 
than 2008. However, the events of “9/11” have forced the timetable to shrink. In fact, 
all SOLAS ships have to be fitted with AIS by 1 July 2004. Whether being accepted 
or not, AIS has been a member of IBS (Refer to Appendix V). Some AISs are stand-
alone units, while others are integrated with Radar/ARPA or ECDIS etc. However 
not many are so. gardnews (2002, p.11) argues that ship operators installed AISs on 
their ships with the minimum cost to meet the minimum carriage requirements 
without understanding their benefits and limitations and without paying much 
attention to navigator training in using AIS properly. With a little or no training, 
navigators have to use AIS to serve safety as well as security. AIS experts have 
recognized its potential for safety. However, they are still working hard to discover 
AIS’s limitations. Poorly trained OOWs would make AIS potential compromised and 
might contribute to AIS-assisted accidents. Thus, some safety-related issues resulting 
from AIS have been debated recently.     
  
Summary:  Navigators have benefited from IBS, however its risks to safety have 
come out simultaneously without being well known. The newcomer, AIS, is 
supposed to contribute more to safety, but without being well understood by the 
navigators, AIS could make IBS’s risks much higher to safety than before. Therefore, 
it is essential to study AIS’s capabilities and limitations, especially on collision 
avoidance and situation awareness. Officers who have to use AIS should be well 
trained in its use. 
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Chapter III       
  
AIS Triggered Safety Issues 
 
“…Until now we have been very busy in getting technology under control.” 
(Patrick O’Ferrall, Chairman of LIoyd’s Register, 1996) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Due to the accelerated process of AIS installation on all SOLAS ships, manufactures 
have not been left much time to develop their AIS products. They have been pushed 
hard to meet the minimum requirements to catch the surge in AIS installation within 
the shipping industry. A series of trials with objectives to  evaluate AIS’s value as a 
navigation aid have been carried out over the past few years and experts are still 
working on further trials and the evaluation of the results. Navigators have 
appreciated the benefits of AIS to safety but at the same time, the AIS experts and 
users find that there are several inherent deficiencies and technical problems that 
have been left unsolved.  
 
Several problems are highlighted, such as the non-integration between AIS and other 
electric equipment of IBS; risks to non-AIS small ships; the poor location of the AIS 
display unit on the bridge; wrong and uncoordinated message transfer; interference 
among Radar, AIS, GPS etc.   
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3.2 Carriage Requirements of AIS 
 
To be aware of what ships have been fitted with AIS is a pre-condition in examining 
the limitations of AIS and its effect on safety. In addition, some ships have been 
fitted with Class A AIS, while others are about to be fitted with Class B AIS. Both 
Classes of AIS have effects on safety. According to SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 
19, the carriage requirements of AIS are mandatory for certain types of ships. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. carriage requirements of AIS laid down in the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) extend to the effects on self-propelled 
vessels of 20 meters or more in length. Furthermore, some standards and guidelines 
of AIS adopted by IMO describe how AIS should perform, how it should be operated 
and where it should be fitted.  
 
3.2.1 AIS carriage requirements of SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 
According to Regulation 19, all ships of 300 GRT or upwards would have been fitted 
with AIS by 1 July 2004. The details in Regulation 19 are as follows:  
 
2.4.2.4 in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 
300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, 
not later than the first safety equipment survey after 1 July 2004 or by 
31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier. (IMO, 2002a) 
 
Warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or operated by governments are 
not required to be fitted with AIS (IMO, 2002a). The majority of leisure craft and 
fishing vessels are unlikely to be fitted with AIS for many years to come, if ever. 
Also, objects, such as containers lost overboard, other flotsam and ice obviously will 
not be fitted with AIS (Stitt, 2004). Off-shore platforms and navigation aids are also 
not required to be fitted with AIS according to SOLAS. 
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3.2.2 U.S. Carriage Requirements of AIS 
The MTSA (2002) delineates the U.S. AIS carriage requirements. The requirements 
are nearly identical to SOLAS. The special requirements are as follows: 
 
 § 164.46 Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
(a.1) Self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in length, other than 
passenger and fishing vessels, in commercial service and on an 
international voyage, not later than December 31, 2004. (USCG, 2004)  
 
3.2.3 AIS Standards and Guidelines  
Currently, there are several standards and guidelines to affect the performance of 
AIS.  
(1) IMO Resolution MSC.74 (69), Annex 3, i.e. Recommendation on 
Performance Standards for a Universal Ship borne Automatic Identification 
Systems (AIS).  
(2) ITU-R Recommendation M.1371-1, i.e. Technical Characteristics for a 
Universal Ship borne Automatic Identification System Using Time Division 
Multiple Access in the Maritime Mobile Band.  
(3) IEC 61993-2 Ed.1, Maritime navigation and radio communication 
requirements - Automatic identification systems (AIS) - Part 2: Class A ship 
borne equipment of the universal automatic identification system (AIS) - 
Operational and performance requirements, methods of test and required test 
results  
(4) IMO Resolution A.917 (22), i.e. Guidelines for the onboard operational use 
of shipborne automatic identification system (AIS).  
(5) IMO SN/Circ. 227, Guidelines for the installation of a shipborne automatic 
identification system (AIS).  
(6) IALA Recommendation on AIS Shore Stations and Networking Aspects 
Relating to the AIS Service, Edition 1.0, September 5, 2002.  
                                                                      (USCG, 2004) 
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3.2.4 Types of Automatic Identification Systems  
There are two types of AIS, i.e. Class A and Class B.  
(1) Class A is the ship-borne mobile equipment intended for vessels meeting 
IMO AIS carriage requirements. 
(2) Class B is the ship borne mobile equipment, which provides facilities not 
necessarily in accordance with IMO AIS carriage requirements. IEC has 
begun work on a Class B certification standard, which should be completed 
by 2004 - 2005.   The Class B is nearly identical to the Class A, but with the 
following exceptions: 
· Has a reporting rate less than a Class A (e.g. every 30 sec. when 
under 14 knots, as opposed to every 10 sec. for Class A); 
· Does not transmit the vessel’s IMO number or call sign;  
· Does not transmit ETA or destination;  
· Does not transmit navigational status;  
· Is only required to receive, not transmit, text safety messages;  
· Is only required to receive, not transmit, application identifiers;  
· Does not transmit rate of turn information  
· Does not transmit maximum present static draught  
                                                                   (USCG, 2004) 
 
3.3 AIS Information 
 
The IMO Resolution A.917 (22) states that the purpose of AIS is to help identify 
vessels; assist in target tracking; simplify information exchange (e.g. reduce verbal 
mandatory ship reporting); and provide additional information to assist situation 
awareness. The on-board AIS broadcasts a series of standardised information to 
achieve the purpose. 
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3.3.1 The Information Provided by AIS 
According to IMO Resolution MSC 74(69), the information provided by AIS should 
include the following.  
(1) I.D.: MMSI number (Maritime Mobile Service Identify) 
(2) Static: 
· IMO number (where available) 
· Call sign & name 
· Length and beam 
· Type of ship 
· Location of position-fixing antenna on the ship (aft of bow and port 
or starboard of centerline) 
(3) Dynamic: 
· Ship's position with accuracy indication and integrity status 
· Time in UTC 
· Course over ground 
· Speed over ground 
· Heading 
· Navigational status (e.g. NUC, at anchor, etc. - manual input) 
· Rate of turn (where available) 
· Optional - Angle of heel (where available) 
· Optional - Pitch and roll (where available) 
(3) Voyage related: 
· Ship's draught 
· Hazardous cargo (type) 
· Destination and ETA (at Master’s discretion) 
· Optional - Route plan (waypoints) 
(4) Short safety-related message 
(IMO MSC 74 (69), May 1998) 
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In addition, according to IMO Resolution A.917 (22), navigational statuses that are 
recommended to use are listed as follows1: 
(1) Underway by engines 
(2) At anchor 
(3) Not under command (NUC) 
(4) Restricted in ability to maneuver (RIATM) 
(5) Moored 
(6) Constrained by draught 
(7) Aground 
(8) Engaged in fishing 
(9) Underway by sail 
 (IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002)  
 
3.3.2 AIS Information Update Rates 
According to the IMO performance standards (IMO A.917 (22)), the data is 
autonomously sent at different update rates: 
(1) Dynamic information dependent on speed and course alteration (see Table 3-1),  
(2) Static and voyage related data every 6 minutes or on request (responds 
automatically without user action). 
   
   Type of ship Reporting interval 
Ship at anchor 3 min 
Ship 0-14 knots 12 sec 
Ship 0-14 knots and changing course 4 sec 
Ship 14-23 knots 6 sec 
Ship 14-23 knots and changing course 2 sec 
Ship >23 knots 3 sec 
Ship >23 knots and changing course 2 sec 
Table 3- 1: Report Rate of Dynamic AIS Information 
                                                 
1 Navigational status information has to be manually entered by an OOW and changed as necessary. 
In practice, since all these relate to the COLREGs, any change that is needed could be undertaken at 
the same time that the lights or shapes were changed. 
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3.4   Display of AIS Information 
 
The AIS provides data that can be presented on the minimum display or on any 
suitable display. In the 50th session of IMO NAV 50, a Performance Standards for 
Radar Equipment are proposed by Norway. The presentation of AIS on radar is also 
included in the standards.  
 
3.4.1 Minimum Display 
The minimum Keyboard display, so called MKD, provides not less than three lines 
of data consisting of bearing, range and the name of a selected ship. Other data of the 
ship can be displayed by horizontal scrolling of data, but scrolling of bearing and 
range is not possible. Vertical scrolling will show all the other ships known to the 
AIS1. In Appendix IX of this paper, there is a Figure “AIS-Minimum Keyboard 
Display” to show an AIS Display unit with Minimum Keyboard Display (MKD). 
Only a ship’s MMSI, names, range and bearing are shown on the screen. If the OOW 
wants to identify a Radar target, he/she needs to associate the Radar target with an 
AIS target by AIS target’s range and bearing. Sometimes, it is difficult for OOWs to 
associate an AIS target with a Radar target. Professor Berking (August 2004) argued 
in an AIS-related lecture at World Maritime University in Malmö Sweden that the 
MKD of AIS information is worth less to improve the safety of navigation  
 
3.4.2 Graphical Display 
AIS information can be shown on a stand-alone graphical display. Where AIS 
information is used with a graphical display, the following target types are 
recommended for display2: 
(1) Sleeping target-A sleeping target indicates only the presence of a vessel 
equipped with AIS in a certain location. No additional information is 
presented until activated, thus avoiding information overload. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
1 IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002. 
2 IMO A.917 (22), 25th January 2002. 
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(2) Activated target-If the user wants to know more about a vessel’s motion, 
he has simply to activate the target (sleeping), so that the display shows 
immediately: 
· A vector (speed and course over ground), 
· The heading, and 
· ROT indication (if available) to display actually initiated course 
changes. 
(3) Selected target-If the user wants detailed information on a target 
(activated or sleeping), he may select it. Then the data received, as well 
as the calculated CPA and TCPA values, will be shown in an 
alphanumeric window. The special navigation status will also be 
indicated in the alphanumeric data field and not together with the target 
directly. 
(4) Dangerous target-If an AIS target (activated or not) is calculated to pass 
pre-set CPA and TCPA limits, it will be classified and displayed as a 
dangerous target and an alarm will be given. 
(5) Lost target-If a signal of any AIS target at a distance of less than a preset 
value is not received, a lost target symbol will appear at the latest 
position and an alarm will be given. 
 
The stand-alone graphical display of AIS information can present more information 
than the MKD, such as a ship’s heading, ROT, COG, SOG etc. Although AIS targets 
are presented as symbols and are categorized, one major drawback of the stand-alone 
graphical display is that AIS targets are not automatically associated with Radar 
targets.  
 
3.4.3  Radar Display 
AIS and Radar data association was highlighted in the 50th session of IMO NAV 50. 
The proposal of the Performance Standards for Radar Equipment submitted by 
Norway states that the most logical display for indication graphically AIS 
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information form other ships is the radar display. Radar tracking information can also 
be significantly enhanced by incorporating information available form AIS (IMO 
NAV 50, April 2004). 
 
In the Performance Standards, AIS target capacity, filtering of AIS sleeping targets, 
activation of AIS targets, AIS presentation status, AIS graphical presentation, AIS 
target data, operational alarms as well as AIS and radar target association are 
mentioned. As long as the proposal is adopted and enters into force, the new radar 
equipment should be capable of presenting AIS information and meet the 
requirements. In order to avoid the presentation of two target symbols for the same 
physical target, the principles of AIS and Radar target association are qualified as 
follows: 
 
(1) If the target data form AIS and radar tracking are both available and if the 
association criteria 1 (e.g. position, motion) are fulfilled such that the AIS and 
radar information are considered as one physical target, then as a default 
condition, the activated AIS target symbol and the alphanumeric AIS target data 
should be automatically selected and displayed. 
(2) The user should have the option to change the default condition to the display of 
tracked radar targets and should be permitted to select either radar tracking or 
AIS alphanumeric data. 
(3) For an associated target, if the AIS and radar information become sufficiently 
different, the AIS and radar information should be considered as two distinct 
targets and one activated AIS target and one radar-tracked target should be 
displayed. No alarm should be raised. (IMO NAV 50, April 2004). 
 
In the Appendix X, there is a Figure “AIS and Radar Data Association” to show how 
AIS and Radar data are associated. In this Figure, AIS targets are presented with 
                                                 
1Simplified Static Association Criteria: Range < 5%; Bearing< 5°; Speed < +/-5 kts; Course < +/-20°. 
(Berking, 2004) 
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small triangles. Each triangle is associated with a single radar target. The OOW can 
easily identify which radar target is associated with which AIS target. By selecting of 
any AIS target, the OOW will know the particulars of the radar target.   
 
3.5 Non-AIS Ships 
 
There are some ships that are not required to carry an AIS, such as non-SOLAS 
ships, SOLAS ships of less than 300GRT and ships engaged in national voyages, 
which are less than 500GRT.  Therefore, an AIS cannot detect them. In order to 
remind OOWs of being aware of non-AIS ships, cautions are given in IMO 
Resolution A.917 (22). They are as follows: 
 
CAUTION 
(1) Not all ships carry AIS. 
(2) The officer of the watch (OOW) should always be aware that other 
ships, in particular leisure craft, fishing boats and warships, and 
some coastal shore stations including Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) 
centres, might not be fitted with AIS. 
(3) The OOW should always be aware that AIS fitted on other ships as 
a mandatory carriage requirement might, under certain 
circumstances, be switched off on the master's professional 
judgment. 
                                                                                                 (IMO, 2002b) 
 
Experts, who attended the trial of the 2002 Test of AIS1, suggest that regulators and 
coastal authorities should require boats that are longer than 20 m to carry AIS, and 
                                                 
1 The AIS Test in British Columbia Summer 2002 is a project where the Bridge Teams of 3 modern 
cruise ships evaluated the current implementation of AIS during the summer of 2002 while cruising 
British Columbian and S. E. Alaskan waters. Their evaluation resulted in findings and 
recommendations aimed at improving its value as a navigation aid. For information, refer to 
http://www.uais.org/CruiseShipIIFinalReportV1.2.htm  
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the regulators should simplify the technical requirements for class “B” transponders, 
so that their component and production costs can be reduced.  Furthermore, coastal 
authorities should broadcast ARPA targets of ships and boats that are not fitted with 
AIS and are longer than 20 m in LOA (UAIS, 2004).  
 
3.6 Connecting Problems with Pre-1995 Versions of GPS  
 
According to IMO Resolution SIN/Cir 227, sensors installed to meet the carriage 
requirements of SOLAS Chapter V should be connected to AIS. The sensor 
information transmitted by AIS should be the same information being used for 
navigation of the ship (IMO, 2003a). Therefore, existing GPSs, as well as other 
sensors that have been used for navigation of ships, are recommended to be 
connected to AIS. However, because of different versions of communication 
protocols, problems with connecting AIS with existing sensors exist. 
 
Pot (2002a) points out that proper installation of AIS on older ships is complicated 
by the requirements that AIS broadcasts positions, SOG and COG from the same 
GPS being used for navigation, because Pre-1995 versions of GPS use old 
communication protocol that AIS does not understand. The same problems exist 
when connecting AIS with other sensors. The United Kingdom has submitted a proposal 
to review resolution A.917 (22) where it has mentioned similar problems as follows: 
 
To meet the Performance Standards in Resolution MSC. 74(69), AIS 
equipment must be interfaced to an external Electronic Position Fixing 
System  (EPFS  - most commonly GPS).  However, some older EPFS 
that do not meet the latest IMO performance standards in Resolution 
MSC. 112(73) are interfaced to AIS. In addition, older EPFS 
equipment may not include any significant check on the integrity of 
the data being sent to the AIS transmitter. This is also true for other 
sensors connected, such as compass, Rate Of Turn (ROT) (where 
installed) and speed log. (IMO NAV 50/4/2, April 2004) 
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The response to the UK’s proposal is that NAV 50 has decided not to change A.917 
yet, but to keep an Eye on AIS problems in practical onboard use. According to 
Resolution of A.917 (22), an AIS consists of, among others things, a built in GPS for 
timing purposes and position redundancy (IMO, 2002b). See Appendix I. Even 
though GPS with new communication protocol can provide ship positions for AIS, 
the ship’s positions transmitted by AIS should be the same ones that are derived for 
the GPS used for the navigation of the ship.  
 
3.7 AIS Impacts on Detecting of Risks of Collision  
 
Berking & Pettersson (2002) note that there are some concerns on AIS, i.e. AIS 
might replace radar; mariners might over-rely on AIS; and COLREGs might be 
unduly changed or disobeyed.  
 
3.7.1 AIS does not Replace Radar 
The potentials and objectives of AIS both in ship-ship and ship-shore communication 
are to:  
(1) Identify vessels; 
(2) Assist in and improve target tracking (near real-time, ground-stabilized, 
small risk of target loss); 
(3) Immediately present course alterations of targets; 
(4) Provide additional information to determine risks of collision; 
(5) Provide an overview and improve traffic flow; 
(6) Reduce and simplify (verbal) information exchange. 
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002) 
 
The limitations of Radar can be summarised as follows: 
(1) Radar does not allow identification of other targets; 
(2) The display of radar target echoes may be obscured by clutter; 
(3) Radar coverage (range performance) may be limited by rain and snow; 
Chapter III                                                                     AIS Triggered Safety Issues 
 26
(4) Target detection is limited by masking (bends, bridges, other objects);  
(5) The shape of the echo display may appear different from the shape of the 
target. Thus, the centre of reflection is different from the centre of the 
target; 
(6) The discrimination of targets close to each other is limited; 
(7) For tracking, radar echo based positions and velocities must be 
smoothed. Consequently, 
· All ARPA data are delayed; in particular; 
· Manoeuvre detection is significantly delayed. 
(8) Automatically tracked targets may be lost due to clutter, fast manoeuvres 
and target swap. 
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002) 
 
It seems that AIS can compensate Radar’s deficiencies, especially in the 
identification of targets and instant manoeuvre detection etc. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for people to remain in some doubt that AIS would replace Radar in the 
near future and become an important tool for safety and a powerful source of 
supplementary information available to OOWs for collision avoidance.  
 
However, since not all ships are equipped with AIS, or the AIS might be switched 
off at the Master’s discretion, it could not provide an accurate picture of traffic flow 
around ones own ship. Berking & Pettersson (2002) emphasise that it is essential to 
keep the radar on-board and use it as usual as the most important tool for collision 
avoidance. Also, Pettersson (2001) emphasises that navigators should be aware of the 
differences between Radar and AIS and of the importance of turning Radar on to 
detect non-AIS small ships. Furthermore, people are further worried that with an AIS 
display on a Radar/ARPA or ECDIS screen, an OOW might ignore “fine tuning” the 
Radar to detect small ships. Finally, IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:   
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AIS is an additional source of navigational information. It does not 
replace, but supports, navigational systems such as radar target-
tracking and VTS; and the user should not rely on AIS as the sole 
information system, but should make use of all safety-relevant 
information available. (IMO, 2002b)  
 
3.7.2 AIS Impacts on the COLREGs 
In an article dealing with how AIS interacts with COLREGs, Still (2004) has 
examined several Rules and discussed what kind of effects AIS would have on 
COLREGs. He concludes that AIS is nothing more than one of several tools that 
should enable navigators to execute their existing obligations under the COLREGs 
and AIS does not change directly the requirements of the Rules, although it does 
provide an important source of additional information to enhance OOWs’ “situation 
awareness”. However, he argues that Rules 6 and 7 may have to be amended to 
provide specific guidance on the use of AIS and to recognise the effect of AIS. In 
addition, Rule 19 will need to be amended, because AIS will provide another tool to 
assist in determining if a risk of collision exists. In particular, Rule 19(d) should 
reflect AIS’s potential.  
 
Furthermore, IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:   
 
The use of AIS does not negate the responsibility of the OOW to 
comply at all times with COLREGs. The use of AIS on board ship is 
not intended to have any special impact on the composition of the 
navigational watch, which should continue to be determined in 
accordance with the STCW Convention. (IMO, 2002b) 
 
Berking & Pettersson (2002) emphasise that there may be agreed action 
contradictory to COLREGs between ships. Their answer regarding the question 
whether COLREGs need to be amended because of the introduction of AIS is no. 
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3.7.3 Over-reliance on AIS  
Being recognized that AIS can provide more information than needed, and also being 
aware that AIS has limitations of its sources of data input, experts worry that OOWs 
would tend to be over-reliant on AIS. This issue was highlighted during the IMO 
NAV 50th session. Besides the mentioned problems in Section 3.4 of this Chapter, 
the proposal further emphasises that: 
 
It is recognized that Problems have been experienced with regard to 
setting up AIS installations on board ship to Ensure that the correct 
static, dynamic and voyage related information will be transmitted. 
There is therefore a concern that over-reliance on AIS information for 
navigational safety Should be avoided until steps can be taken to 
ensure that all transmitting ships provide the Necessary degree of data 
accuracy and integrity for all connected sensors and that the existing 
Guidance in Resolution A.917 (22) does not adequately cover these 
concerns. (IMO NAV 50/4/2, April 2004) 
 
IMO Resolution A.917 (22) suggests that:   
 
The information given by the AIS may not be a complete picture of 
the situation around the ship. The accuracy of AIS information 
received is only as good as the accuracy of the AIS information 
transmitted. Poorly configured or calibrated ship sensors (position, 
speed and heading sensors) might lead to incorrect information being 
transmitted. Incorrect information about one ship displayed on the 
bridge of another could be dangerously confusing. The user should not 
rely on AIS as the sole information system, but should make use of all 
safety-relevant information available. (IMO, 2002b) 
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3.8 The Issues of AIS Training 
 
Concerns on AIS training will focus on what AIS training should cover and how it 
should be taught, what a syllabus should contain, what training standards and 
assessment standards for competency should be, and if AIS training should be 
mandatory, as well as if the STCW code should be amended to introduce provisions 
of AIS training. A Model Course covering AIS training should be developed. 
 
Currently there are no legal instruments to be directly referred to creating an AIS 
training syllabus. Winbow (2003) advises that basic AIS training operations at the 
level of the minimum installation allowed on board should be addressed. In 
particular, fundamental skills, such as setting up the AIS, entry and changing of 
voyage data, changing screens and selecting relevant information etc. must be taught. 
He further points out besides training for AIS operation, the AIS’s use in conjunction 
with Radar and ECDIS should be addressed during the training. However, the extent 
to which it should be addressed remains in question. He finally stresses that the use 
of AIS information and how to correlate AIS data with that from other sources-
visual, radar, ECDIS, VHF etc, has to be focused on any training; OOWs should 
have the knowledge and skills to be able to select the correct source or sources of 
information before making navigation and other decisions.  
 
3.9 The Issues of the Integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA or ECDIS 
 
According to IMO Resolution MSC.74 (69), AIS should be provided with an 
interface through which AIS information could be presented on a separate system. 
Also, referring to Resolution A. 917(22), AIS consists of, among others, interfaces to 
Radar/ARPA, ECDIS/ECS and INS. If the integration of AIS with this equipment 
had been achievable, the effectiveness of AIS would be significantly increased. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that a MKD with three lines of data is the minimum 
display requirement. The integration of AIS with other equipment is recommended.   
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Currently, a three-line MKD of AIS information meets the minimum mandatory 
carriage requirements. However, it is not accepted to assist OOWs in decision 
making for collision avoidance. In addition a stand-alone MKD AIS has a screen 
separated from the Radar/ARPA or ECDIS screen. In the Summary of the 2002 Test 
of AIS, team members on one cruise ship commented that it is almost impossible for 
OOWs to monitor 2 or 3 separate screens and, worse than that, OOWs need to 
associate AIS targets with Radar/ARPA targets. This makes AIS information 
distracting rather than a supplementary information source for collision avoidance 
and surveillance awareness. The experts suggest that the regulators and competent 
authorities are to require SOLAS ships to integrate AIS information on existing 
navigation screens (UAIS, 2004).  
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Chapter IV 
 
Advantages and Limitations of AIS 
 
It is imperative that shipowners ensure that the gap in the human-
technology interface is bridged by providing competent 
comprehensive training in operation and understanding the limitations 
of high technology equipment and an awareness of the “distraction” 
factors. (gardnews, 166, May/July 2002) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To know well the advantages and limitations of AIS is important to develop a good 
training syllabus. From the competency point of view, not only should navigators 
know how to operate AIS, but they also should know its advantages and limitations. 
Without the proper knowledge of AIS’s limitations, the operation of the system 
might lead to AIS-assisted accidents.  
 
4.2 Advantages of AIS  
 
Several advantages of AIS have been identified. Most of them are widely recognized, 
such as ship identification using AIS; real-time dynamic display of AIS information; 
enlarged coverage of AIS; positive effects on VHF traffic volume; instant detection 
of ship’s data and providing more accurate information etc.  
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4.2.1 Ship Identification Using AIS 
One of the purposes of AIS on board a ship is to help identify vessels. The AIS 
information transmitted by a ship is of three different types, e.g. static information, 
dynamic information and voyage-related information. First, static information can 
show a ship’s particulars. An OOW can anticipate a ship’s maneuvering ability based 
on the ship’s length and beam, the type of the ship and the ship’s draught. However, 
it is difficult to achieve this by Radar observation. Secondly, the OOW can call other 
ships by their names and call signs. It is easy for OOWs to establish communication 
between ships. In contrast, it is difficult for OOWs to establish voice contact between 
ships by a radar bearing and distance. Thirdly, AIS can provide an OOW with a 
ship’s real-time positions and its COG and SOG. However, Radar cannot do these. 
Finally, AIS can provide an OOW with a ship’s navigational status; this is another 
element that is not available with Radar. The ship heading, the Rate of turn, COG 
and SOG can help an OOW predict the ship path in minutes or in an even long period 
of time. Radar itself cannot provide a ship’s COG and SOG, the Rate of turn. Radar 
can indicate a ship’s heading, but sometimes there is a delay because Radar 
determination is based on relative motion. This will be proved later in Chapter IV 
Section 4.2.5. In Appendix VIII of this paper, an example of AIS information display 
on PC Screen is presented by a Figure. In this Figure, another ship’s particulars are 
shown on the right bottom. Thus the OOW on own ship can know another ship’s 
name, ID, positions etc. that are important for the safety of navigation. On the left side 
of the Figure, a ship path is plotted which is also important for collision avoidance.   
 
4.2.2 Real-time Dynamic Display of AIS Information 
In a new version of AIS, many impressive symbols of AIS targets can be presented 
on a Radar or ECDIS screen, such as the relative true scale outline of an AIS target. 
It is quite easy for navigators to recognize any maneuvers taken by other ships.  With 
some brands of AIS, real time tracking of a ship’s movements can be shown on the 
Radar or ECDIS screen. Therefore, AIS makes navigators quickly recognize the 
intention of other ships in the vicinity. Most important is that the vectors of a ship’s 
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movements are shown properly, hence navigators can be aware of the intention of the 
targets at a quick glance. This will definitely ease a navigator’s mental stress and 
workload while passing those critical areas. This feature reduces the possibility of 
human error introduced in interpreting radar target data or visual observation. 
 
In an AIS Conference in 2003, Eddle Hadnett, a former P&O deck officer, said that 
no less than 26 different large cruise ships in the summer of 2003 were operating 
within Alaska’s inside passage. The navigational conditions there are complicated 
due to the confined waters with numerous navigational hazards and large tidal 
ranges. Under these conditions, AIS is an invaluable tool in assisting the bridge team 
to effectively manage collision avoidance, reducing the number of close-quarters 
situations to a minimum (Fairplay, November 2003).  
 
4.2.3 Enlarged Coverage of AIS 
In AIS, VHF frequencies are used to broadcast messages. Therefore, the coverage of 
AIS should be 20-30 nautical miles. Actually, the coverage would be larger than it is 
expected. During the author’s survey trip1 on board the ROBIN HOOD, the author 
noticed that a few far stations had been identified. For example, the three furthest 
ships on 107 nm, 81nm and 69 nm were examined. Of course, those ships are not 
relevant to collision avoidance decision-making. Atmospheric ducting results in a 
great extension of the VHF reception range. It can be concluded that coverage of AIS 
is larger than that of Radar and Visual lookout.  
 
The frequencies broadcast by AIS can propagate far away, further than the human eye 
can see visually and the Radar can track. In addition, they can travel over some 
geographical obstacles, such as hills or buildings. This feature allows AIS to show 
more targets than Radar can track and navigators can see visually. Furthermore, AIS 
                                                 
1 During the field trip to Germany, the author has been on board Ro-Ro ferries, ROBIN HOOD and 
NILS HOLGERSSON. This has been the only chance for the author to observe how AIS works on 
ships and to interview deck officers about their opinions and perspectives on AIS.  
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was found to be especially useful in presenting targets in Radar blind spots or around 
bends in rivers etc.  
 
In areas such as dense fog or heavy rain, and narrow waters with complicated 
geographical situations, AIS makes “hidden” targets visible when “hidden” targets 
are equipped with AIS units. Phil (2004) says that AIS works independently of Radar 
and can thus display information about ships around bends in rivers and is not 
susceptible to target swap. This capability of AIS will help navigators to detect a 
closing vessel early. The navigator can then set a course to avoid interaction. 
 
4.2.4 Effects on VHF Traffic Volume  
 
It is believed that Using AIS properly will reduce the traffic volume between ships 
and VTS operators and improve vessel traffic image accuracy. 
 
4.2.4.1   Reducing Traffic Volume Between Ships and VTS Operators 
Most VTS organizations in the world present their own regulations to cover certain 
types of ships when approaching or entering the VTS areas. They require vessels to 
report certain information to VTS centers. For example, when sailing in Singapore 
Strait VTS areas, navigators need frequent voice exchange with VTS operators. This 
is time-consuming, especially for navigators with bad spoken English. AIS is found 
to reduce VHF voice messages and improve safety. The use of AIS would minimise 
language problems and reduce the chances of vessels misunderstanding messages 
from a VTS centre and vice versa (IALA, 2002), 
 
The Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) of Singapore completed a pilot project in 
1999 to evaluate the performance of such a system and the results from the pilot test 
indicated that AIS ship transponders could reduce a VTS operator’s time spent on 
verbal communications by as much as half (UAIS, 2004).  
 
4.2.4.2  Improved Traffic Image Accuracy 
ARPA vessel tracking is sensitive to interference. For example, it is easy to lose 
targets, due to the interference of rough seas, heavy rain or snow etc. Sometimes 
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track swap takes place, especially when two vessels are close to each other. This is an 
inherent deficiency of ARPA track. The proximity of the two close targets makes 
ARPA confused, and swapping may occur. The result of swapping is that the 
identification of one track is transferred to the other (IALA, 2002). Although AIS 
cannot provide a complete picture of the situation around the ship or within VTS 
areas, it can definitely improve the quality of traffic image and AIS can effectively 
avoid target swapping.  
 
4.2.5     Instant Detections of Ship’s Manoeuvring Intention  
The AIS provides other ship’s manoeuvring data in nearly real time, while ARPA 
calculates that based on historic Radar data. With the high rate of data updating, AIS 
can provide ship’s manoeuvring data much quicker than that of ARPA. 
Consequently, the accuracy of target data can be improved and the effectiveness of 
action taken can be increased. Berking & Pettersson (2002) indicates the different 
presentation between AIS data and ARPA ones’ using an example as follows:  
 
A long tanker starts to turn to starboard. The ship’s heading will then change 
to starboard, but initially the stern with its antenna will swing slightly to 
port, as the ship is turning around its pivot point (Fig. 4-1). For some time, 
the ARPA vector will (at least might) show port. The ARPA radar tracks the 
part of the ship which gives the best radar return, normally on a loaded 
tanker the superstructure at the stern. A big 
tanker, turning and tracked by ARPA radar, 
could have turned 40-60°, before this is 
detected by the ARPA radar on another ship 
or at the VTS, and 3 –5 minutes could have 
passed since the turn started. With the AIS 
sending the heading from the gyro 
(maximum +/- 2° error) at intervals down to 
2 seconds, this misinformation from the 
radar can be eliminated with a significant 
improvement in the situational awareness.  
Figure 4-1: Potential ARPA “tracking error” or “interpretation error” 
(Berking & Pettersson, 2002) 
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4.2.6 AIS Provides More Accurate Information Than Radar 
In the 50th session of IMO NAV, Norway submitted the Draft Radar Performance 
Standards for Ship-borne Radar Equipment in 2004. In this Performance Standards, 
the radar system range and bearing accuracy requirements are defined as follows: 
(1) Range: within 30m or 1% of the screen range scale in use, whichever is greater; 
(2) Bearing: within 1°. 
Meanwhile, Tracked Target Accuracy is defined as such that measured target range 
and bearing should be within 50m (or +/- 1% of target range) and two degrees. 
 
In contrast, IMO MSC adopted the Resolution MSC.112 (73)-The Revised 
Performance Standards for Ship-borne GPS Receiver Equipment in December 2000. 
In this Performance Standards, Paragraph 3.15 states that when a GPS receiver is 
equipped with a differential receiver, performance standards for static and dynamic 
accuracies should be 10 m (95%). 
 
In addition, Berking & Pettersson (2002) claims that firstly the ship’s Radar/ARPA can 
provide a ship’s position with the accuracy less then 30m. But the accuracy of AIS 
ship’s positions is between 1 and 5m. Secondly, the CPA and TCPA determined by 
Radar/ARPA are based on the radar distance and bearing. And the accuracy of CPA 
determined by ARPA is within 0.5 to 0.7 nm. However, the CPA and TCPA 
provided by AIS are based on D/GNSS. See Appendix IV. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the AIS information is more accurate than Radar’s. 
 
4.3   Limitations of AIS 
 
Apart from considerable direct benefits to navigators and shore-based authorities, 
there are several safety issues concerned, such as the passing arrangement against 
COLREGs; risks to small boats; switching off AIS; the potential for its misuse by 
pirates, armed robbers or terrorists etc.  
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4.3.1 Passing Arrangement Against COLREGs  
The capability of AIS to identify nearby vessel traffic is likely to induce navigators 
to make passing arrangements individually. It is much easier to do this than before 
the introduction of AIS. Nowadays, both ships that are in a close quarters situation 
are identified by name, motion vectors etc. Navigators will tend to contact each other 
to make passing arrangements against COLREGs. Before the introduction of AIS, 
navigators used to make a call on VHF to attempt to identify each other and find out 
if they are the ones at risk of collision. In some cases, a navigator was calling the 
other, but the other did not respond, even though he/she knew they had been called. 
In fact, most Chinese navigators tend to do this. Sometimes, it is difficult to get 
positive identification, even though the conversation is being established. Therefore, 
there was always a possibility that the ships that have contacted each other are not 
actually the ones talking. Navigators have learnt lessons from collisions that resulted 
from this kind of conversation and are aware of that. Naturally they tend just to 
comply with COLREGs even if the conversation is established between ships and 
kept alert until the risk is over.  
 
With AIS, the barrier of misidentification is minimized. Navigators know well the 
ships they want to talk with and they are confident in making private arrangements. 
There are no more fears left to make private agreements that may be against 
COLREGs. When they do that, it definitely confuses nearby ships, because the 
nearby ships will observe unusual behaviour done by the two ships at that moment. 
The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS suggests that making private passing 
arrangements would be dangerous because other nearby ships, even if they were 
equipped with AIS, would not be aware of the specific arrangements (WMC, 2002). 
Therefore, navigators should be aware of this and avoid making such arrangements, 
especially when they are anti-COLREGs. For the young generation of seafarers, 
effective training will make them aware. 
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4.3.2   Negative Effects of Poorly Located AIS Display Units on Safety 
On board old ships, Radars are installed away from the chart room, in which GPSs 
have been fitted and, more often than not, AIS have also sometimes been installed, 
near to the GPSs. In these cases, if a navigator wants to get a dangerous target’s 
particulars, he/she needs to shift eyes from the Radar to the AIS. It might take a few 
minutes to go back to the Radar to keep an eye on the target. This naturally, is not 
secure watch keeping and might also discourage the navigator from looking at the 
AIS screen. Therefore, AIS will be less beneficial to safety. Figures 4-2 and 4-3 
present two examples of poorly located AIS units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIS 
location 
Figure 4-2  Example of A Poorly located AIS Display Unit (1) 
(Source: Pratt, 2004)
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In addition, some old-versions of AIS may only display certain types of text, such as 
a list in small black font size to show certain items of ship particulars. In these cases, 
how long navigators will spend catching what they want depends on how capable 
they are of interpreting the text. That is a limitation of AIS that needs senior officers 
to become aware of. During the 2002 Test of AIS, Bridge Teams felt that AIS 
information should be shown on Radar and ECDIS screens, since it is unsafe if 
navigators are required to shift watch from Radar or ECDIS screens to a separate 
AIS screen from time to time. The Teams also felt that it takes too much time to 
interpret AIS target information on a separate AIS screen and then associate it with 
visually observed target information on RADAR/ARPA or ECDIS screens.  The 
Teams added that it is too distracting, and in that sense, AIS could be a deterrent 
rather than an aid to navigation (WMC, 2002).  
 
Normally, navigators are used to keeping their eyes on the Radar/ARPA screens, 
therefore the above-mentioned problems give good excuses for them to give up 
watching the separate screen of the AIS. One may argue that ignoring AIS means 
cutting a source of watch keeping distraction. This problem will hamper the 
execution of potential AIS’s functionality.  A solution to this problem could be by 
using a modem to transfer the existing AIS message format to be consistent with the 
 
AIS Location AIS Pilot Plug 
Figure 4-3  Example of A Poorly Located AIS Display Unit (2) 
(Source: Pratt, 2004)
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Radar/ARPA display or ECDIS display.  Since both AIS and other electronic sets are 
technically different, the barrier is difficult to break and thus the alternative could be 
shifting AIS next to one of the other screens.  Although this is not a very sound 
solution, for the existing AIS on board ships, it could be a cost-effective way to help 
AIS to be used correctly.   
 
The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS suggests that manufacturers of ISB should 
allow a ship operator to upgrade the software of an existing Bridge System at a 
reasonable cost so that it will display AIS information on Radar and ECDIS screens 
(WMC, 2002).  
 
4.3.3 Wrong and Uncoordinated Messages Transmitting via AIS 
A recent study shows that in many cases wrong messages have been put in AIS and 
then sent out. Such wrong messages may be related to the draught of a vessel, a 
ship’s callsign, cargo names, as well as destinations etc. Phil (2004) says that many 
VTS operators have already reported that between 60 and 80 percent of all AIS 
messages contain errors. Some errors come from not updating messages in AIS, and 
some others result from incorrect message input. A lack of coordinated and unified 
message codes makes certain messages ambiguous.  
 
At the 50th session of IMO sub-committee on safety of navigation, four northwest 
European countries, including Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden highlighted 
the problem that mariners are using different names for the same destination, when 
entering destination data in their AIS units. They identified that numerous variations 
in the spelling of the same port makes it difficult for other vessels and shore 
authorities to identify the port uniquely. A suggestion to coordinate the message 
format of the destination was submitted at this session (IMO NAV 50, April 2004). 
A solution to this problem could be the efficient training for using AIS. Training 
makes navigators aware of the potential risk to a ship’s safety. Furthermore, training 
will make them more responsible for that.  
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A Collision Avoidance Policy, which was proposed by USCG in 2003, suggests that 
under certain conditions, ships transmitting improper or wrong messages will be 
imposed fines detailed here:  
 
AIS enforcement under the proposed policy will allow two warnings 
before fines are imposed. An AIS Violation is committed if a ship, that is 
required to carry an AIS Device, is either not transmitting the proper 
messages or if the content of the messages is erroneous. A VTS operator 
who notices an AIS Violation will issue a formal warning. (UAIS, 2003) 
 
4.3.4 Potential Risks to Small Boats 
Nowadays, the enclosed bridge is becoming popular on new built ships. The 
navigators will have a good working place on those ships and enjoy the watch-
keeping. As a result, navigators will at least lose the opportunity to listen for the fog 
signals of other ships as they did on older vessels. Moreover, they will lose the touch 
of the ambience by feeling, instead acquiring the situations around their ships by 
monitoring IBS, especially by Radar/ARPA, ECDIS, AIS etc.  
 
4.3.4.1 Risks to Non-SOLAS Ships 
AIS provides far more than navigators want. If lucky, AIS information will be 
presented on Radar and ECDIS screens, and then navigators will sit on a comfortable 
chair in front of impressive pictures and tend to concentrate on the pictures instead of 
looking out of the window. This tendency will impose a great risk on small boats. 
Most navigators have the experience that small boats, especially wooden fishing 
boats, are difficult to be detected by radar. They are aware and remain alert to that. 
While the information of AIS will partially solve this problem if some small boats are 
equipped with AIS, there is still a big percentage of small boats that have no AIS is on 
board at all. This means AIS cannot help the big ships to detect non-AIS small boats.  
 
The most dangerous point here is that some of the small boats have AIS and some 
others do not. Navigators perhaps spend too much time monitoring screens and in 
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turn they do less to keep a visual look-out. Therefore, the possibility to find out non-
AIS small boats by visual look-out will decrease. This will certainly increase the 
collision risk for small boats. Navigators shall be aware that there are a huge number 
of non-SOLAS ships sailing around the world, including small boats. The AIS is the 
non-mandatory carriage requirement for them. For example, many yachts in 
northwest European countries are not fitted with AIS. Meanwhile, some owners of 
fishing boats in developing countries cannot afford to fit AIS. Even though some 
small boats are fitted with AIS on a voluntary basis, without proper competent 
training, crews cannot use it correctly or sometimes the AIS itself does not work 
properly.   
 
4.3.4.2 Risks by Overload of AIS Information 
On ECDIS screens, only AIS-boats are shown, if the AIS is working properly, 
whereas non-AIS boats are not be shown. Therefore if navigators concentrate on an 
ECDIS screen, it is easy to ignore non-AIS small boats in the vicinity. While on 
Radar screens, apart from the non-AIS boats not being shown, there is another 
potential problem, i.e. it is possible for too many symbols of AIS-ships to be shown 
around the center of the screens.  In turn, the overload of AIS-ships’ symbols will 
saturate non-AIS radar targets nearby the own ship, especially in bad weather 
conditions. No doubt, there are some non-SOLAS small boats fitted with individual 
AIS. Those AIS symbols will be concentrated on the radar screens of big ships. This 
would contribute to the saturation of non-AIS radar targets. Without effective 
training, it is easy for navigators to ignore the non-AIS boats ahead of them. At the 
same time, the crew on board small boats may think that the big ships will give way 
to them as usual. However, with AIS, the situation might be different. Navigators will 
tend to either ignore non-AIS small boats or discover them too late to take action. 
Fortunately, some navigators have already noticed this problem and keep alert when 
surrounded by small boats. During the author’s survey trip on board the MV NILS 
HOSGERSSON and MV ROBIN HOOD, the OOWs were aware that most of the 
yachts sailing in the Baltic Sea are not fitted with AIS.  
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4.3.5 Switching off AIS 
AIS might, under certain circumstances, be switched off, based on the master’s 
professional judgement. According to Regulation 19, Chapter V, SOLAS, all ships 
fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where 
international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational 
information (IMO, 2002).  In certain circumstances, AIS should be switched off for 
safety or business purposes. However, the effects on safety should be identified and 
proper training should be taken for navigators to be aware of this.   
 
Sometimes Captains should switch off the AIS at their discretion. For example, when 
sailing in some areas where pirates prevail, such as the Malacca Straits, The Captain 
will not want everyone in the vicinity to know what the ship is carrying. At that 
moment, it is the Captain’s responsibility to switch off the AIS in order to secure the 
ship. Furthermore, navigators shall be aware that some AIS equipped ships do not 
turn AIS on for competitive reasons when operating in certain areas. For instance, 
fishing boats do not want to make their locations public when fishing.  
 
4.3.6 The Accuracy of AIS Information is Dependent on Other Equipment 
In the 50th session of IMO NAV, the United Kingdom submitted a proposal - 
Requirements for the Display and Use of AIS Information on Ship-borne 
Navigational Displays in 2004. In this proposal, Paragraph 7 states that: 
 
According to IMO Resolution MSC.74(69)1 and SN/Sirc.2172, all 
ships are required to transmit, if available, position, COG and 
SOG(supplied by a GPS to the AIS equipment itself) via AIS. 
However, the integrity, reliability and accuracy of the source data con 
not necessarily be relied upon. For example, Resolution A.819(19)3 
                                                 
1  IMO Resolution MSC.74(69) Performance Standards for AIS. 
2 IMO SN/Circ.217 on the Interim Guidelines for the Presentation and Display of AIS Target   
Information. 
3 IMO Resolution A.819(19) on the Performance Standards Applicable for GPS Receivers Installed 
before 1 July 2003. 
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and associated Test Standard IEC.61108-1 Ed 1 contain no 
requirements for:   
· The use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM); 
· Generation of COG and SOG and output to the digital interface; 
· Marking of the validity of any such COG and SOG output; and  
· Accuracy of any such COG and SOG output. 
Furthermore, there were no requirements and therefore no controls for 
the way in which, COG and SOG information may or may not be, 
smoothed, filtered or averaged, before being output to the interface. 
 
In addition, Paragraph 8 in this proposal states that: 
 
The accuracy of all received AIS information, including that of 
position, COG and SOG, transmitted via AIS should be relied upon 
until the integrity of the information is proven. 
 
The accuracy of AIS information depends on the other ship’s equipment. For 
example, the GPS provides the AIS with a ship’s position, course and speed over 
ground. This means the limitations of GPS will definitely affect the accuracy of the 
system’s information. Therefore, cross-checking with other data is necessary before 
using the AIS information. Furthermore, the OOW is involved in putting voyage 
related and short safety related messages in the AIS, thus human errors might be 
experienced. Hence, the reliability of these kinds of AIS information is likely 
decrease.   
 
Stitt (2004) argues that:  
 
AIS is linked to GPS as its basis for positioning and for computing 
course and speed over the ground. Thus, any GPS errors will be 
reflected in the outputs. Information on heading and rates of turn may 
be derived from other sensors. None of those sensors can be 
monitored by the receiving vessel.  
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Whereas Ramsvik (2004) notes in his article:   
 
For the pre 2003 GPSs, course and speed from GPS are not defined at 
all; the filters are of great different and the accuracy is unknown. For 
the post 2003 GPS, the accuracy is known but the filters are 
undefined. Therefore ARPA information and AIS information will not 
be the same.  
 
AIS is independent from Radar, therefore the AIS may keep away from the effect of 
Radar limitations. However, if AIS information is shown on Radar screens, 
conflicting and confusing information may occur that will cause navigational 
distraction. On the other hand, if AIS information is presented on a Radar/ARPA 
screen, navigators can make a choice, either AIS target symbol or Radar echo/ARPA 
track symbol. Navigators should be aware that the two kinds of data might be 
different.  Stitt (2004) argues that: 
 
Radar/ARPA may be operated in a variety of modes, such as true 
motion sets in water-stabilised or ground-stabilised, relative motion. 
He mentions none of these will correspond directly with AIS 
information. Watchkeeper will need to be able to appreciate the effects 
of the differences. Also, AIS information is of ground-stabilised, 
while Radar/ARPA information is of sea stabilised. Therefore the 
display and the effect on true vectors may be different. 
 
The course and speed over ground is very different from the course and speed 
through the water. Therefore for the same target, the information from AIS is 
different from that of the Radar, i.e. navigators will get different data for the same 
target from the two information sources. 
 
Germany proposes that if the AIS and Radar information are considered as one target, 
then as a default condition, the activated AIS target symbol and the alphanumeric AIS 
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target should be automatically selected and displayed (IMO, 2004). Berking (2004) 
notes that the data have to be “optimised” and the automatic association function has 
to check if a set of radar data and a set of AIS data match and belong to the same 
physical target. He adds that the “target” association criteria have not yet been finally 
developed.   
 
4.3.7  Non-integration Between AIS and ECDIS &Radar/ARPA 
Non-integration between AIS & ECDIS, Radar/ARPA is being recognized gradually. 
On board MV NILE HOLGERSSON, AIS, Radar/ARPA and ECDIS were produced 
by the same manufacturer, i.e. ATLAS. The AIS is integrated with Radar/ARPA, 
ECDIS pretty well. Radar/ARPA and ECDIS were installed in a user-friendly way. It 
is very convenient for OOW to swift his/her eyes from one to another. Also, AIS 
information can be displayed on demand on the Radar/ARPA and ECDIS screens. 
While MV ROBIN HOOD was built in 1995 and delivered to serve in 1996, on this 
ship, AIS cannot be integrated with Radar/ARPA as they are produced by different 
manufacturers, i.e. ALTAS for Radar, NAUTICAST for AIS. The AIS is a stand-
alone unit with its own screen in text display.  
 
So far, many ships have been fitted with old versions of AIS and might only meet the 
minimum requirements of AIS information display, i.e. the 3-line MKD. In addition, 
earlier AIS products have been designed to stand-alone and integration with other 
electronic equipment such as Radar/ARPA, ECDIS etc has not been looked at. 
Furthermore, there were technical barriers to achieve the consistency among 
electronic units produced by different manufacturers.  
 
IMO has recognised that many AIS have already been fitted without integration with 
other electronic equipment. Therefore, certain performance standards that highlight 
AIS’s integration were adopted on the basis of guidelines. However, they are non-
mandatory. In turn, non-integration will exist for a long time. Many AIS will serve 
only to meet the mandatory SOLAS requirements. Whether it can benefit a ship’s 
Chapter IV                                                            Advantages and Limitations of AIS  
 47
safety depends on the OOW’s capability to use it properly. For ship owners, they will 
be interested in the minimum carriage requirements of AIS, rather than how much 
AIS will benefit safety and how efficient their employees can use it.  
 
Human eyes are more sensitive in observing moving or flashing symbols than fixed 
black text. No doubt, if AIS information cannot be displayed on Radar/ARPA or 
ECDIS, its functionality will be compromised greatly.  
 
In 2002, WMC organized a test of AIS. One of the participating vessels, IAANDAM 
had integrated problem between the AIS and the NAVISAILOR ECDIS. The bridge 
team suggested that AIS information should be displayed both on radar and ECDIS 
with an option to select which information to show. STN-ATLAS has this option but 
not all others. On board another ship, VOLENDAM, the bridge team felt that a listing 
of AIS targets was not useful in assessing the traffic situation mostly because it was 
not integrated with Radar. That means AIS targets do not relate with Radar targets 
(WMC, 2002).  
 
The final report of the 2002 Test of AIS also indicated that on ships, integration of 
AIS was not achieved (WMC, 2002). Many manufacturers had achieved the 
harmonized AIS display on their own products, such as ATLAS, TRANSACT 
MARINE, etc. but, so far, integration of the AIS display in different Brands of 
electronic equipment has not been realised. Owners of new built ships can buy a 
package of products, and then the problem can be solved in the first place. However, 
in existing ships, the problems may exist for a long time. Since this problem cannot 
be solved in the near future during training programs, such characteristics should be 
identified and an approach to improve AIS benefits should be discussed.  
 
In a Collision Avoidance Policy, USCG (2003) proposed that if AIS information was 
not displayed on a ship’s Radar or ECDIS screen, it was to be seen as an AIS 
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violation and huge fines will be charged if the conditions are not met as detailed 
here: 
An AIS Violation is committed if an Inspector finds that AIS 
information is not displayed on the ships ECS, ECDIS or Radar. Port 
State Competent Authorities will log such Violations in the EQUASIS 
database for follow-up. The amount of AIS Violation fines will be set 
at 0.1 % of a ship's estimated market value for the 3rd violation and 
double with each additional violation. (UAIS, 2003) 
 
Different manufacturers apply different information protocol to produce their 
products. Therefore technical barriers exist in integrating them. Hence from a 
technical point of view, it is not feasible to require all existing ships to meet USCG’s 
specific requirements on AIS. The SOLAS convention does not require that. IMO 
guidelines related to AIS performance are a sort of soft law and hence there is no 
legal support to require all existing ships to meet this requirement.   
 
4.3.8    Negative Effects of Pilot Laptop Display of AIS Data 
More and more AIS pilot plugs have been fitted as a package to AIS units (see Fig. 4-3). 
AIS information will be displayed on the ENC on the pilot laptop, even if there is a 
MKD AIS. If OOWs have been working on a MKD AIS ship, they might not be 
comfortable with colourful and flashing AIS symbols presented on ENC. Therefore, this 
will discourage team members from intervening a pilot’s decision-making. This is a 
potential risk to safety, especially when sailing in heavy traffic areas. The Captain should 
be aware of this and take action to increase the information exchange in the bridge team.  
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Chapter V     
    
Current Status and Limitations of AIS Training 
 
Some owners may be lured by manufactures into buying sophisticated 
shipboard equipment by highlighting the additional safety as well as 
long-term saving costs without sufficient attention being given to the 
training of those who are going to have use the equipment.  
(gardnews, 166 May/July 2002) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The implementation of mandatory AIS carriage on board ships has been accelerated 
due to the events of “9/11”. There are not enough trials to disclose its potentials and 
limitations. In addition, regulations and training standards are not keeping pace with 
these hurried steps and the current AIS training proceeds without approved 
standards. There are no criteria to evaluate the competency of trainees. Meanwhile, 
on board training is not receiving enough attention and, as a result, there is no well-
organized training. Although there are conventions, regulations, a Resolution, Model 
courses, and training programs to be referred to develop AIS training programs, none 
of them directly stress AIS training. These documents, if faithfully interpreted, can 
be considered as a framework for developing AIS training programs.  
 
To develop an effective training program, there are several important issues to be 
addressed, such as the faithful interpretation of relevant conventions and regulations; 
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understanding the current situation of AIS installation and training and development 
of very defined and complete training syllabus etc.  
 
5.2 Requirements related to AIS Training in Conventions and Regulations  
 
Chapter V SOLAS requires mandatory carriage of AIS. Although it does not directly 
stress AIS training, it does give fundamental requirements for it. It is well known that 
a faithful interpretation will contribute to developing a practical standard and valid 
training syllabus. They will all become bases to amend relevent conventions, 
especially when introducing AIS training provisions.  
 
Currently, both COLREGS and STCW 95 are not involved in the use of AIS 
information and AIS related training. However, certain provisions in these Conventions 
do give some references for administrators to develop standards to cover AIS training, 
and for training officers to produce an AIS training syllabus.  To meet the training needs, 
administrators and training centre officers will have to make their own interpretations to 
develop standards for AIS training and training syllabi respectively. 
 
5.2.1 AIS Training Requirements in SOLAS Chapter V,  
Subparagraph 2.4, Regulation 19 provides guidance on the use of AIS information. It 
requires that OOWs should be capable of: 
(1) Providing and updating dynamic messages, such as navigational status, and 
other safety-related information, as well as monitoring static messages; 
(2) Monitoring traffic situations and tracking ships; 
(3) Exchanging data with shore-based facilities, if on demand. 
 
It further stresses that OOWs should also know special international agreements, rules, 
or standards for the protection of navigational information, such as security-related or 
fishery information. Further, AIS operation should comply with IMO Resolution 
A.917 (22). 
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5.2.2 Rules Relating to AIS Training in COLREGs 
Both AIS static and dynamic messages are important for situational awareness and 
collision avoidance. COLREGs provides regulations to cover both aspects. Training is 
an efficient tool to make OOWs capable of using AIS information properly to assist 
collision avoidance and to keep surveillance. Therefore as COLREGs is a legal reference 
for AIS training, when developing AIS training syllabus, the Rules hereinafter 
mentioned should be taken into account.   
 
5.2.2.1 Rule 5 Look-out   
The phrase  “by all available means appropriate…” laid out in this rule, can be 
understood to mean that AIS is included as a navigational aid. Carriage of AIS is 
mandatory for SOLAS ships. Hence “proper look-out” should include the use of AIS 
for collision avoidance. Meanwhile, AIS information is crucial for OOWs to make a 
decision. Therefore, this rule could also be interpreted as to require OOWs to be 
capable of using AIS information properly to make collision avoidance decisions. 
Stitt (2004) emphasises that it is widely recognised that Rule 5 involves maintaining 
good ”situational awareness” and reacting properly to the relevant facts and 
circumstances. AIS will make OOWs well aware of situations if the information is 
interpreted properly and used correctly.  
 
5.2.2.2 Rule 7 Risk of Collision 
Rule 7 (b) requires proper use of radar to obtain an early warning of risks of 
collision. If AIS is integrated with Radar/ARPA, AIS information shown on 
Radar/ARPA screens can definitely provide an early warning of the risks of collision. 
AIS can overcome Radar limitations in early warnings as defined in Chapter III. It 
therefore follows that OOWs should properly observe AIS information on a Radar 
Screen to acquire early warning. Stitt (2004) argues that Rule 7(b) could include 
intelligent correlation of radar and AIS information. Details, such as course and 
speed as obtained by ARPA or other methods of plotting, should be compared with 
AIS information and the causes of any substantial differences should be determined.  
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5.2.2.3 Rules 8, 16 and 17 AIS-an Important Monitoring Role 
AIS’s principle and its capabilities make it play an important monitoring role. This 
role can meet the requirements that certain Rules, such as Rule 8, Rule 16 and 17 
provide. Stitt (2004) emphasises that:  
 
 Not only can AIS assist OOWs to make an early assessment of if a 
risk of collision exists, but also subsequently enable them to monitor 
action taken by other ships. The dynamic messages show much earlier 
and more accurate information than radar of if the other ship alters the 
course and speed. In addition, the static messages present a broad 
picture of the other ship’s size and type, and hence the OOW can 
anticipate her likely manoeuvring features.  
 
According to Rules 5, 7, 8, 16,17 and so on, during training, navigators should 
acquire the capabilities of properly interpreting and using AIS information for 
collision avoidance, as well as maintaining good situational awareness. In addition, 
the ability for correlation of Radar and AIS information, as well as recognization of 
material differences between AIS and Radar/ARPA information, should also be 
acquired. Furthermore, the effective use of AIS information to monitor a ship’s 
safety of passage should be an integral part of any syllabus.  
 
5.2.3 AIS Training-related Requirements in STCW Code 
STCW95 is a framework for seafarer training today. It was designed in such a way 
that regulations in the Convention and provisions in the Code correspond to each 
other. The detailed technical requirements and their supporting Resolution are also 
provided in the Code. All technical provisions in STCW 95 were specified in less 
ambiguous language. Moreover, provisions of the Code define the minimum 
requirements of MET and IMO has developed a series of Model Courses to guide 
seafarer training in light of the technical provisions.   
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Although the STCW 95 Code does not make specific references to AIS training 
directly, Regulation I/14 and Table A-II are associated with it.  
  
5.2.3.1 Interpretation of Regulation I/14 
Subparagraph 1.4 of Regulation I/14 states that companies are responsible for 
ensuring that seafarers are familiar with all equipment relevant to their routine or 
emergency duties.  Thus, it can be interpreted that companies are responsible for 
navigators to be familiar with AIS, especially in respect of operation, limitations and 
capabilities. Even though, in the near future, AIS-related training can be carried out 
widely, the familiarization with ship-specific AIS operation is still needed. Stitt 
(2004) argues that because different manufacturers will have different “bells and 
whistles” on their equipment (AIS), a significant part of any training appears likely 
to have to be devoted to how to use a particular set. 
 
One can imagine that because of limited financial resources, a training center is 
likely fitted with a specific brand of AIS; the demonstration during AIS training will 
be based on the AIS operation procedure of that brand. However, on board ship 
OOWs will probably face another brand of AIS. Hence efficient ship-specific AIS 
familiarization is needed. Section A-I/14 states that companies and masters have the 
responsibility for ensuring that newly employed seafarers are familiar with the 
specific equipment and the associated operation procedures relating to their duties. 
Subparagraph 2.2 in this section indicates that familiarization should not be a self-
study by running an hour-long CD or by reading the manufacturers’ handbooks. A 
knowledgeable officer should be assigned to provide enough instructions and 
demonstrations to newcomers until they can operate ship-specific AIS properly. 
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5.2.3.2 Technical References in Table A-II 
Column 2 implicates that trainees should acquire: 
· Knowledge of AIS operating principles, limitations, sources of error, 
detection of misrepresentation of information and methods of corrections; 
· The ability to determine ships position by using electronic navigational aids 
which should include AIS; 
· The ability to operate and to interpret and analyse AIS information shown 
on Radar/ARPA screens; 
· The ability to obtain an accurate position by using AIS; 
· The ability to evaluate navigational information from all sources, including 
AIS, Radar/ARPA, and in turn to make decisions for collision avoidance. 
 
Column 3 can be interpreted in such a way that AIS training can be carried out on 
approved PCs or multi-media, and approved simulators, as well as approved in-
service experience. 
 
Column 4, implicates that Navigators should be capable of: 
· Performance checks and tests to navigation systems, including AIS, 
complying with a manufacturer’s recommendations and good practices; 
· Correcting interpretation and analysing of information from Radar/ARPA, 
including AIS information being shown on screens, while considering the 
limitations of AIS; 
· Taking action to avoid a close encounter or collision.  
 
5.2.4 IMO Resolution for Operational Use of AIS 
Resolution A. 917 (22) was adopted in November 2001. In the Resolution the 
purpose of AIS is stressed, i.e. to help identify vessels; assist in target tracking; 
simplify information exchange; and provide additional information to assist 
situational awareness. The Resolution states the minimum requirements that the user 
should meet before using AIS. Furthermore, the Resolution focuses on detailed 
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description of the system regarding operational and technical aspects as well as 
shore-based application.  Finally, the Resolution is a practical instrument that 
training officers can refer to for developing an effective AIS training syllabus and 
can be considered as a blue book for such. A well-developed syllabus should at least 
meet the minimum requirements as set out. 
 
5.3 Current Situations of AIS Installation  
 
Compared with training for other electronic equipment, AIS training is much further 
behind than the installation process itself. In addition, technical standards to develop 
AIS and to integrate it with other electronic equipment are still being developed. 
Therefore, when on board, OOWs might have to operate differential AIS in terms of 
the technical aspects. Hence it is necessary to analyse the situations of AIS 
installation, in order to develop valid training programs.  
 
Larry Bischoff of Holland American Line explains that for fleet standardization and 
budget considerations he has postponed making a connection between ECDIS and 
AIS for the whole fleet until it has become ”plug-N-play”. He added that connecting 
ECDIS and AIS on the IAANDAM AND VOLENDAM showed that it prolongs 
installation and is not foolproof. Dave Smith of Alaska Tanker Company plans to use 
the minimum keyboard display at least until the dust settles (Pot, 2002). 
 
Like the initial radar sets, some AIS equipment is not particularly user friendly. The 
abridged timetable means that the first generation equipment, usually in the form of 
MKD, will be around for years to come. Many ship owners are unlikely to be willing 
to upgrade their equipment until forced to do so (Stitt, 2004). 
 
Because MKD AIS will exist for a long time, during AIS training, MKD AIS 
operation, its capabilities and limitations, information interpretation, especially in 
association with radar targets shall take a part of the syllabus. Some AIS may have 
connections with few other sources, whereas others may have more sources. The 
potential sources should be re-stressed during the training (See Figure 5-1). Some data can be  
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Figure 5-1  AIS Connections on Board a Ship 
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fed to AIS automatically but certain other data should be entered manually, 
especially dynamic messages, such as, cargo names, destinations, ports of call, 
draught of ship, as well as safety-related messages. Trainees should acquire the 
capabilities to decide what data should be entered and upgraded. Furthermore, as 
long as there are many AISs integrated with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS, AIS training 
should not ignore the links among them. The limitations and proper use of AIS 
information on ECDIS, Radar/ARPA should be identified in a training program.   
 
5.4 Overview of Current Situations of AIS Training 
 
Due to the hurried process to equip vessels with AIS to meet the anti-terrorism 
requirements, manufacturers have failed to give enough time to the development of  
AIS concerning performance, operation procedures, integration and communication 
protocol etc. Unlike GMDSS, the AIS training mechanism is very incomplete. 
Therefore Party States find it difficult to produce effective standards to cover AIS 
training. In addition, training centers have not developed effective programs to carry 
out AIS training. Until now, AIS training is not mandatory and training programs 
vary from one training center to another. In fact, most navigators have not received 
efficient training before AIS is presented to them.  
 
5.4.1 An AIS Training Program of MTC 
The Makarov Training Centre (MTC), St Petersburg, Russia, has developed AIS training 
programs for OOW engaged in AIS use and maintenance for safety of navigation. The 
programs are as follows:  
· International and Russian national legal documents regulating 
AIS installation, operation and servicing; 
· AIS Network structure; 
· Specific features of installation and operation; 
· AIS use for collision prevention; 
· Basic principles of formation and functioning. 
                                                        (MTC, 2004) 
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This training program seems very brief and many important items have not been 
included. There are some other training programs, being carried out in other training 
centers which are similar to this, only meeting the requirements to a certain extent 
that some regulations and provisions in COLREG and STCW 95 can be understood. 
Thus, a complete and efficient training program should be developed to meet these 
requirements so that trainees can use AIS properly.   
 
5.4.2 Limitations of Current Available AIS Training on Board  
In most cases, after installing an AIS, the manufacturer provides a CD for the OOW’s 
self-study. Some CDs cover the operation for only 3-line display in a stand-alone MKD 
AIS and others may cover more about the operation of AIS on Radar/ARPA or ECDIS 
screen, if the integration of AIS with this equipment has been achieved. 
 
Such CDs definitely show the operation procedures of the specific brand of AIS. 
This is enough for OOWs to know how to operate the AIS but probably there is 
nothing related to the limitations of AIS, as well as its deficiencies. There is no 
reason to criticise manufacturers for not describing some of them because there are 
no resolutions or Resolution to cover this. Furthermore, some trials to examine the 
limitations or deficiencies of AIS have been carried out recently and the results need 
to be assessed further. There are several AIS conferences that have been held 
recently or are about to be carried out in the near future. More evidence needs to be 
collected to support the research results. This is a reason why the current CD self-
study training is not efficient for OOWs to be competent to use AIS properly. 
 
 
5.4.3 Lack of Awareness of AIS Training 
It seems that OOWs ignore the importance of AIS training on board. They use 
Radar/ARPA daily, and they push a button, then an information window pops up or 
pops out. They can get what they want by touching a button. It appears that when 
AIS is fitted, using the manufacturers’ handbooks or CD guides, they can also 
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operate it and AIS works as the handbooks or CDs say. Therefore it is a good excuse 
to say that no more AIS training is needed. OOWs who have operated GPSs may 
have the experience that it is easy to operate and properly conclude that AIS 
operation is not any more difficult than that of GPS. However, navigators have 
already learnt a lesson from the ROYAL MAJESTY’s grounding, a GPS-assisted 
accident. Meanwhile there is a persistent belief that if AIS is integrated with a 
Radar/ARPA and someone can operate Radar/ARPA, then he/she can operate AIS 
too. If such is the case, then it would be difficult for OOWs to recognise the 
importance of AIS training. In an AIS 03 seminar, Pratt & Taylor (2004) introduced 
the results of pilots’ survey for an AIS process of installation on board ships calling 
at Southampton and the Tees Bay. They released that:  
 
A number of ships officers on the inquired ships knew little of or indeed 
had heard nothing about. There appeared to be little evidence of any 
formalized training, and navigators are given a few words by the 
installation technician or refer to the information in the manufacturers’ 
handbooks about the use of AIS. They add that unfortunately many 
OOWs don’t recognize the necessity of AIS training.  
 
In view of the current status of training related to AIS, there is not enough that 
involves the capabilities and limitations of AIS. To solve these problems, there is a 
need for better cooperation among the manufacturers, shipowners, navigators, 
training centers and administrators. Firstly, manufacturers should contribute to the 
capabilities and certain limitations of AIS in terms of technical aspects. Secondly, 
navigators who have the experience of using AIS in reality should provide feedback 
about AIS deficiencies and/or limitations in operation aspects. Thirdly, shipowners 
should take the responsibility for collecting this feedback and present it to other 
interested parties. Shipowners should also be in charge of on board AIS 
familiarization training. Finally, the administrators should become the coordinators 
in order to accelerate the development of AIS training programs. 
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Stitt (2004) says that currently most OOWs are not trained properly for the use of 
AIS, as well as its potential benefits and shortcomings, because AIS capabilities and 
limitations have not yet been properly recognized. He adds that the increased 
emphasis is now being set on anti-terrorist and ship-to-shore applications. Thus it can 
be concluded that training for these aspects tends to be the major part of the syllabus. 
As a result, much less training time is allocated to the training of the effective use of 
AIS for collision avoidance and situational awareness. With these limitations, AIS 
training effectiveness is compromised.  
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Chapter VI   
    
Suggestions to Improve AIS Training 
 
“Man is the single greatest asset the shipowner has. He is worth 
looking after, and money spent training him to understand and operate 
technology will pay handsome dividends”.  
                            (John Lang, Chief Inspector Admiral of MAIB, 2002) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The technology is changing faster than the development of training-related rules. 
Administers and training centers are scrambling to keep up. Without guidance by 
training standards, training syllabi at an early stage may always be different from one 
training center to another and, in turn, it is difficult to assess the competency of 
trainees against a widely accepted standard.  
 
Training is an effective tool to keep OOWs updated with technical change. 
Consequently they can use high-tech equipment to serve safety rather than to make 
accidents. IMO has been aware of the importance of training for technical change, 
and W.A. O’Neil has emphasised this point in a few articles, summarising that: 
 
The equipment used on ships is becoming more and more sophisticated. 
It is not correct to say the technology will provide a solution to certain 
problems, because unless properly used technology could make the 
problem worse. This means that the seafarers who have to use it need to 
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be very highly trained. We have to make sure that training keeps pace 
with technical change.  (O’Neil, 1999) 
 
The United Kingdom has further raised the training requirements for the operation of 
AIS at STW 34 through documents STW 34/9/4. However, since STW 34 no further 
development of AIS training appears to have materialized, mainly due to the fact that 
the performance standards have not been finalised. During IMO STW 35th Session, 
the International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) submitted a 
proposal to highlight the requirements for shipboard AIS training once again. The 
proposal suggests that: 
 
Whilst AIS is being implemented to meet security demands, there is 
no doubt that with proper training the use of AIS will enhance safe 
navigation. There is an operational requirement for AIS to be 
operational in 2004 and the operational training will not be available 
at this time. This will mean that many of operational benefits derived 
from AIS will not be understood by the users. Therefore the 
requirements to have proper standardised training requirements for 
operators of AIS is needing urgent consideration.  
(IMO STW 35, November 2003) 
 
IFSMA also recommends that it would not be necessary to amend the STCW 
Convention as the reference to AIS equipment already exists within the Convention. 
The training module relating to AIS could be introduced by developing a Model 
Course in a similar manner to ECDIS (IMO STW 35, November 2003). 
 
Not only shall AIS training focus on the operation of the system itself, but also stress 
any inherent limitations as well as an awareness of risk when using the system. John 
Long (2002) 1emphasized that when carrying out training related to hi-tech, three 
                                                 
1 John Long’s opinion was quoted in Computerisation of bridges and engine rooms:Progress or 
regression (2002, May/July). gardnews, 166,10-12. 
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issues must be considered: an ability to operate the system or equipment correctly; an 
understanding of any limitations and an awareness of the distraction factor. 
 
The fact is that not only do OOWs need to use the information from AIS properly, 
but they should also be capable of filtering appropriate data from several sources and 
make decisions based on that. If AIS training is well organized, then it could ensure 
that OOWs are competent to do this. In order to ensure that OOWs are competent in 
using AIS information properly and in operating AIS correctly, besides effective on-
shore training, on-board training is also important.  
 
6.2 On-shore Training  
 
Until now, AIS training is not mandatory, apart from the mandatory carriage 
requirements of AIS. However, on-shore training has already been carried out in 
many training centers even though the syllabus is very different among training 
centers. To achieve the competency for OOWs to use AIS, consideration should be 
given to the way of carrying on-shore training. Stitt (2004) suggests that, for on-
shore training, time could be better spent on the techniques and procedures for using 
the information that AIS can provide to avoid collisions.  In respect of cost benefit 
and short shore-leave for OOWs, AIS training can be incorporated into ECDIS or 
Radar/ARPA training.  
 
6.2.1 Key Elements of Training Syllabus 
A syllabus is a crucial part of any training program and it could be developed in such 
a way that it could take into account both the current situation and the future. Party 
States may develop guidelines to affect current AIS training based on current 
provisions in STCW 95 and AIS related regulations given by other party states. 
 
Besides the statement of the aims, objectives and learning outcomes, a training 
syllabus should at least cover the following key elements: 
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(1) AIS legislation, regulations, guidelines and requirements; 
(2) Basic AIS operating principles; 
(3) AIS capabilities and limitations defined in Chapter IV; 
(4) Criteria of presentation of AIS information;  
(5) Scenarios and exercises developed for navigators to be familiar with 
the use of AIS;  
(6) Major differences of AIS and Radar/ARPA information;  
(7) Shore-base AIS application. 
 
6.2.2 Exercises and Scenarios of Simulation Training 
With respect to the current situation, if AIS training is completely incorporated into 
ECDIS, and/or Radar/ARPA training, it might be insufficient for competency 
purposes because stand-alone MKD AIS training is still needed. The training should 
take into account both aspects, i.e. MKD AIS training and integrated AIS. However, 
integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA and/or ECDIS is the future philosophy of AIS 
development. While training can be carried out on a PC, or simulator, training on real 
AIS equipment will definitely be the most efficient.   
 
AIS manufacturers normally provide CDs for the end users’ self-study. Training 
centers should be fitted with more than one brand of real AIS equipment. Therefore, 
training officers will have some CDs to demonstrate the basic operations of MKD 
AIS. The CDs can be run on computers. For the purpose of demonstration, this might 
be useful. However, such CDs might not be designed to run on simulators. 
Meanwhile, manufacturers have not done enough to develop effective exercises and 
scenarios for training purposes. The fact is that such CDs are produced by AIS 
manufacturers rather than simulator producers or training program developers with a 
pedagogical background, thus might not meet the demands of training. Hence 
training officers need to develop AIS training exercises and scenarios or to get the 
professional companies to do this for their own needs.  
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When designing exercises, consideration should be given to the following concerns: 
(1) The exercises should focus on developing trainees’ capabilities to 
interpret, analyse and apply AIS information to ensure safety; 
(2) The exercises should include both normal situations and abnormal 
phenomena, such as: 
· Failure of AIS connected sensors; 
· Failure of AIS components. 
(3) Besides some exercises that are designed for MKD AIS, others 
should be integrated with Radar/ARPA, and/or ECDIS training.     
 
AIS training scenarios might be difficult to develop. However, many VTS centers are 
equipped with sophisticated systems and traffic images with AIS information display 
around VTS areas can be filmed. Information technology makes it possible to run 
these films on computers and simulators, thus allowing training officers to access 
films for training purposes. Many training objectives can be achieved by presenting 
scenario-recorded films, such as AIS information interpretation, recognization of AIS 
symbols on Radar/ARPA, ECDIS as well as path predication etc.  In addition, in 
order to improve training effectiveness, trainees’ involvement is necessary during 
simulator training. Appropriate training software needs to be developed, something 
that is the duty of specialized training program developers. However, training 
officers need to define what exercises and scenarios should be created for effective 
AIS training.   
 
6.3 On-board AIS Training 
 
After on-shore AIS training, on-board training and hands on practices are still 
important to keep OOWs fully competent. Besides familiarization, Captains should 
aim to encourage OOWs to use AIS daily, while also paying attention to increasing 
the OOWs’ capabilities of interpreting AIS information not only displayed on MKD, 
but also on Radar/ARPA and ECDIS screens.  
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6.3.1 A Lesson from GMDSS Training 
The Author has been a GMDSS training officer for years in China. During the 
training, the Author has carried out some surveys on how efficient OOWs use 
GMDSS equipment. The surveys give some suggestions about how on-board AIS 
training should be carried out besides on-shore training. GMDSS training has been 
carried out for years. It is expected that after training, OOWs are competent in using  
GMDSS equipment properly for both routine and emergency duties.  
 
However, due to the reduction of the manning level and the reallocation of 
communication and emergency duties, it seems that only Captains can access 
GMDSS equipment. In some cases, 3rd officers can be allowed to operate the 
equipment, as they are supposed to execute communication tasks in an emergency. 
Other OOWs will not be allowed to access GMDSS, because of the sensitive 
information coming in or out via it. No doubt the capabilities of OOWs to operate 
GMDSS equipment will be reduced due to not operating them over a long period.  
 
On-shore training does not work well without the support of on-board training. 
Previously seafaring has been a sort of hands on career whereas, nowadays, it 
appears to be high technology oriented. However some basic knowledge and hands-
on experience is still important. Besides ship-specific AIS formularization, repetition 
of operating AIS is also necessary. During this process, the ability to handle AIS will 
be improved and safety awareness and responsibilities can be acquired. On-board 
training is particularly efficient in these aspects because seafarers are loyal to their 
employers; they love the ships and are easy to motivate and are committed. During 
the first several years of GMDSS equipment on-board, a lot of false alarms caused by 
false operations were received and the SAR organizations issued circulars to 
emphasize the problems. Party States have asked training centers to address these 
problems during on-shore training while ship owners have given their masters 
instructions to solve the problem. It is becoming better now, because of the 
awareness concerning the effects on safety together with the impact of training. 
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Thus, a lesson should be learnt from GMDSS application, when carrying out on-
board AIS training.  
 
6.3.2 Keeping Competency by Doing 
During a presentation in 2003 at WMU, Mr Olsen, the Sale Representative of 
Poseidon Simulation AS, showed some statistics reporting that a majority of marine 
accident alarms in Norwegian coastal waters had been sent from mobile phones 
(Olsen, 2003). This means that people use mobile phones on s daily basis, and in turn 
they are familiar with the operation procedures. Naturally they will pick mobile 
phones up and send alerts out in cases of emergency. Therefore, It follows that if 
OOWs operate AIS often, they will be familiar with it and willing to touch it.  
Furthermore, if OOWs handle AIS information regularly, they will be much more 
sensitive to the information it gives, especially those related to collision avoidance. 
Therefore, as soon as certain strange information occurs, it will be quickly 
recognised and lead OOWs to analyse what is going wrong.   
 
6.3.3 Organization of On-board Training 
The responsibilities laid down in the STCW Code require companies to be in charge 
of on-board training and Captains to carry out on-board AIS training. On-board 
training needs to be well organized to achieve its objectives. To do that, 
consideration should be given to the following issues:  
(1)  Effective use of on-board training materials, resources, aids; 
(2)  Taking care of generation differences between the younger and the older one; 
(3)  Focusing on ship-specific AIS operation and its limitations; 
(4)  Familiarization of ship-specific AIS connected sensors and their limitations; 
(5)  Awareness of integration situations of AIS into IBS; 
(6)  Special requirements of AIS application for anti-terrorist application  
(7)  Well designed training activities, such as follows: 
· Captain’s inquiry of OOWs about AIS basic operational knowledge to 
discover how an OOW is competent; 
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· A discussion among OOWs to consider confusions and clarify them. 
(8) Including the following AIS-related activities in the departure and/or 
daily duty shift schedules: 
· Updating of AIS dynamic data;  
· Checking of the integration of AIS. 
(9) Using AIS information as an integral part of on-boarding training for cadets; 
(10) Exercises on the correct interpretation of AIS data for both MKD display 
and integrated ones; 
(11) Predicting path by a target’s ROT. 
 
Although it is claimed that hi-tech equipment greatly releases navigator’s regional 
workload, it has also been observed that their overall workload is increasing 
considerably. Ship turnover is much quicker than before. It is difficult to organize 
effective on-board training, especially on coastal or short voyage ships. On-board 
training might be more effective and easy to organize on deep-sea ships. Companies 
might make a policy to assign cadets to on-board ocean voyage ships so that they can 
receive well-organized on-board training. In addition, because AIS, as a member of 
IBS, will interact with other equipment on the bridge, AIS training could also be part 
of the integral training of IBS. In particular, Radar/ARPA, ECDIS and AIS could be 
considered as a whole; hence on-board AIS training of this equipment should be 
incorporated. In this way, cadets would understand that this equipment works 
together with and affects the other items.  
 
Existing approved references are enough to be referred to in developing an effective 
syllabus. There is a need for faithful interpretation of relevant provisions in these 
instruments; therefore, amendments to STCW 95 may not need to be hurried. Both on-
shore training and on-board training should be emphasised to ensure OOWs 
competence for using AIS properly. Besides training for the capacities of AIS, the 
inherent limitations and risk of over-reliance on the system should be stressed.  
Learning by doing should thus become the philosophy of AIS training.  
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Chapter VII     
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
From the discussions in this paper, the findings of this researcher may be 
summarised briefly as follows: reservation of traditional skills is necessary in the 
event of failure of AIS and other high-tech equipment in IBS; the roles of AIS and 
it’s negative effects on collision avoidance need to be well known; proper training is 
necessary for the OOWs to be competent in using AIS properly. 
 
7.1.1 Reservation of Traditional Skills 
When examining contents laid down in Table II, STCW Code, besides requirements 
of capabilities of using modern technology, traditional skills, such as celestial, 
terrestrial and coastal navigation, are also required to meet requirements of 
competency. High-tech equipment in IBS makes ships much easier to be commanded 
than before, without much input of the OOW. However, it can be two-side edge for 
safety. When it goes wrong, the OOW will be less dependent on it. In this sense, 
traditional navigational skills will be the back-up in the event of failure of such 
equipment in IBS. 
 
Training should focus on not only modern electronic technology, but also on 
traditional navigational skills. The young generation should be aware of the 
importance of traditional navigational skill and should understand that AIS, is not 
designed to replace navigators, but to support them to keep surveillance awareness 
and make decision of collision avoidance. 
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7.1.2 Awareness of the Roles of AIS 
Although AIS can greatly enhance situation awareness and provide valuable 
information for collision avoidance if properly used, the roles of AIS in IBS should 
be re-examined and reconsidered. AIS should be recognised as: 
· An information providing system; 
· One of the important navigational tools; 
· A dependent system from external sensors; 
· It does not replace Radar/ARPA but AIS and Radar can complement each other; 
· Human elements are involved in updating certain AIS information; 
· The use of AIS does not negate OOWs’ responsibility in COLREGs and does 
not affect the composition of watch keeping; 
· AIS may not provide a complete picture of the traffic flow around a ship: 
· OOW should not place over-reliance on AIS; 
· Crosschecking with other data is essential before using AIS information. 
 
7.1.3 Awareness of Negative Effects of AIS on Safety 
Firstly, the OOW should know that some types of ships might not be equipped with 
AIS and that AIS fitted on other ships might be switched off at Captains’ discretion. 
AIS cannot detect non-AIS small boats and the ships that their AIS are switched off. 
Early warning alarm on collision targets has been incorporated as a result of the 
introduction of AIS. This will alert the OOW to a collision risk at an early stage even 
before it can be detected by Radar or visually. However, this can lead to the OOW 
being over-reliant on AIS. This is specially a risk in case of the non-AIS targets 
which cannot be detected at an earlier stage. The AIS is not a substitute for officer 
lookout but can only provide supplementary information for collision avoidance and 
situation awareness. It should not be used as a sole source of navigation information 
but only as a tool to enhance the safety of navigation  
 
Secondly, the integration between AIS and ECDIS & Radar/ARPA has not yet been 
achieved currently. Since AIS information cannot be overlaid on Radar or ECDIS, its 
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benefits will be compromised considerably. Most ships have been fitted with MKD 
AIS and the MKD AIS itself has less contribution to safety. The OOW has to 
associate AIS targets with Radar targets by the target bearing and range shown on the 
MKD AIS in order to identify other ships. Whether this can benefit a ship’s safety 
depends on the OOW’s capability to correlate the two targets properly.  
 
Thirdly, the integrity, reliability and accuracy of AIS source data cannot necessarily 
be relied upon since the use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) 
and the accuracy and validity of COG/SOG output are not required by approved 
standards currently. The OOW should be aware that the accuracy of dynamic AIS 
information depends on the other ship’s equipment and that the reliability of static, 
voyage related and short safety related messages might decrease since Humans are 
involved in putting these data in the system. Hence, the accuracy of all received AIS 
information including that of position, COG and SOG, should not be relied upon 
until the integrity of the information is proved.  The OOW should do cross-checking 
with other data before using the AIS information. 
 
Finally, the AIS should be installed at a position from which the ship is normally 
operated. It is much preferred to place the AIS as close as possible to Radar/ARPA, 
or ECDIS. However, there are some ships on which the AIS are at improper places. 
On those ships, the AIS can be a watchkeeping distraction if it is not used properly. 
The OOW should be aware of its negative effects on safety.  
 
7.1.4 The Need for AIS Training 
Firstly, the urgent need for proper standardised training requirements for operators of 
AIS has been highlighted in the 35th session of IMO STW in 2004. ALSO, Paragraph 
2 of IMO Resolution A.917 (22) states that the user should become familiar with the 
operation of the equipment, including the correct interpretation of the displayed data. 
Without the proper operational training, many of the operational benefits derived 
from AIS will not be understood by the users.  Thus, the users should receive the 
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approved AIS training in order to be competent in using the system properly and 
interpreting its information displayed on the Radar Screen or ECDIS. Such training is 
the key to empower the users to be aware of the limitations and capabilities of the 
AIS as well as the consequences of transmission of outdated data.   
 
Secondly, the AIS has become a number of IBS currently. Although the MKD AIS 
meets the minimum carriage requirement of SOLAS ships, the presentation of AIS 
on Radar is included in the Draft Radar Performance Standards for ship-borne Radar 
Equipment submitted by Norway in the 50th session of IMO NAV in 2004. Thus, the 
new ship-borne radar equipment will be able to display AIS information. 
Furthermore, AIS information can also be presented on ECDIS. Therefore, on the 
same screen, the OOWs will face different sources of information and this 
information will be complicatedly associated, which will bring some inherent 
deficiencies. Hence, the OOWs should know the criteria of the association of the 
information as well as its deficiencies so that they can use the displayed AIS 
information correctly to handle the ships in a safe manner.   
 
Thirdly, the necessity of AIS training has not yet been properly recognized presently 
and most navigators have not received proper training before using the AIS on board.   
Although, the manufacturers may provide the operational manuals and CDs for on 
board self-study training, which are focused on the particular brands of the AIS. 
These materials are not enough to keep the users to be competent in using the AIS 
and interpreting the displayed AIS information correctly. Therefore, both on-shore 
AIS training in accordance with approved standards and well-organized on-board 
training are important for the OOWs to be competent to use AIS properly.  
 
Finally, Training can be an effective tool in training navigators to be competent in 
handling AIS generated information and its interpretation, failure of external data 
input, crosschecking of information and enabling AIS to contribute to the safety 
rather than to cause accidents. Companies will always gain when spending money on 
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seafaring training. The rewards of that for safety can be huge. Both on-board training 
and on-shore training should consist of company policy for safety culture and the 
companies should organize for the AIS training.  
 
7.2 Recommendations 
 
Based on the study in this paper, an AIS training syllabus is proposed; suggestions to 
amendments of ATCW 95 are given; how to use AIS properly on board a ship and 
how to choose a proper AIS training program are recommended.   
 
7.2.1 Using AIS properly and Attending Shore-based AIS Training 
With regard to current situations of installation of stand-alone MKD AIS, OOWs 
may have a little benefit from potentials of AIS in collision avoidance. In addition, 
without proper training in using AIS, it can be a factor of watch keeping distraction.  
 
In view of these limitations, a company perhaps whose whole fleet is equipped with 
MKD AIS, can make a policy to guide the OOWs on MKD AIS for broadcasting 
information to other ships or shore-based authorities. The OOWs should be informed 
of the potential risks of using a MKD AIS as a tool for assisting in collision 
avoidance.  
 
On-board training may also focus on basic operation of MKD AIS, choices of data 
input etc. It is believed that in the future, with software development, AIS can be 
integrated with Radar/ARPA, or ECDIS by “plug N play”. Therefore, when taking 
shore-based AIS training programs, those that cover both a MKD AIS and integrated 
one would be appreciated. If part of training can be run on simulation, it is believed 
that training effectiveness will be greatly improved. On the other hand, the OOWs 
might have a little chance to operate integrated AIS on board. Therefore they may 
quickly loose their capabilities to handle integrated AIS. Therefore, on board training can 
be effective in updating the capabilities by Distance Learning. By this way, the OOWs 
could be updated for integrated AIS operation. This will contribute to safety greatly.  
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7. 2.2    Amendments of STCW 95 
STCW 95 should also be amended so that mandatory AIS training can be introduced 
and AIS training provisions can be inserted. However, if whether it is the correct 
time to amend STCW 95 is questionable. Probably not now, because many ships 
have been equipped with MKD type AIS and Integration of AIS with other ship 
borne electronic equipment is still being developed. Moreover, capabilities and 
limitations are being discovered through a series of trials. It can be a long process to 
develop effective provisions to be added into the STCW Code to guide effective AIS 
training at the moment. The AIS training provisions should come out when the dust 
settles. 
 
Existing Conventions, Guidelines, Regulations do provide a legal framework for 
developing AIS training programs. The key point is how interested parties interpret 
them faithfully so that these instruments can guide a well-developed training 
syllabus. Amendments to STCW 95 on the AIS training should not be done in a 
similar way to that of the AIS installation. More time should be given to develop 
realistic and practical provisions to cover the AIS training. In addition, when 
amending STCW 95, the training for ECDIS, VDR and Radar/ARPA should be 
synchronized with the AIS training for ergonomic principles and user-friendly 
purposes.   
 
7.2.3 AIS Training Syllabus 
 A well-developed AIS training syllabus is the key to achieve the objectives of the 
training. Based on the study of this paper, an AIS training syllabus is proposed. The 
syllabus meets basic requirements of current legal instruments on the basis of faithful 
interpretation and covers both basic operations of AIS and capabilities and 
limitations of using AIS on collision avoidance. When developing the syllabus, some 
proposals submitted by IMO Party States during sessions of Sub. Committee on 
safety of navigation have been referred. This syllabus can be used to develop an AIS 
training program. It is the author’s belief that the syllabus can contribute to the 
validity of AIS training. The details of the syllabus are shown on Table 7-1.  
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Syllabus of AIS Training1   
 
 
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency 
 
1.  Legal aspects and requirements 
 
Area objectives: Describe the essential legal aspects and responsibilities in the use of AIS 
 
1.1 Explain: 
.1       SOLAS Chapter V, carriage requirements 
.2       STCW 95 training requirements related to AIS 
.3       COLREGs Rules related to AIS operation 
.4       IMO performance standards for AIS, A.74 (69) 
.5        IMO Resolution A.917 (22) 
                 .6        USCG MTSA AIS operation requirements 
 
2.  AIS principles and Basic operations  
 
Area objectives: Explain AIS principles and describe AIS basic operations. 
 
1.2 Explain: 
.1       The fundamental principles of AIS 
.2       Coverage of AIS 
.3       AIS system (overview) 
.4       Technical description of AIS 
.5       Activation of AIS units 
.6       AIS components, functionalities, connections 
.7        Different types of AIS information sent by ships 
.8        Different update rates of AIS data 
.9        Difference between AIS stabilised mode and Radar/ARPA stabilised mode 
.10      “Pseudo” AIS information 
.11      Unified and coordinated messages for AIS information 
.12      Master discretion of switching off AIS and recording the action 
.13      An automatic built-in integrity test (BIIT)  
 
1.3 Describe: 
.1        Setting up and maintaining an AIS display 
.2        Basic AIS operation at MKD level 
.3        Advanced operation integration of AIS with Radar/ARPA, ECDIS etc 
.4        Manual input of data 
.5        Checks of AIS input information, including the following items: 
· Failure of heading information and ROT 
·       Failure of COG/SOG 
·       Position input information 
· Outdated voyage data 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 IMO Reference, Textbooks/Publication are referred to the Bibliography in this dissertation.  
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3.  AIS capabilities and limitations  
 
Area objectives: Describe AIS capabilities and limitations as well as their impacts on safety. 
 
3.1   Describe: 
 .1      AIS capabilities on collision avoidance 
· Automatic Identification and dynamic data indication  
· Path prediction provided by AIS 
· Course change erroneously observed on an ARPA and a significant 
improvement provided by AIS 
· Compensation of respective deficiencies between AIS and Radar 
.2      AIS limitations on collision avoidance 
.3      Non-SOLAS ships and SOLAS ships switching off AIS 
.4      Incomplete picture of the situation around the ships 
.5      Non-integration between AIS and ECDIS & Radar/ARPA 
.6      Limitations of using MKD AIS 
.7      Impacts of a poorly located AIS display unit on safety 
 
3.2   Explain: 
.1      Awareness of AIS triggered safety issues on bridge 
 
4.   Presentation of AIS 
 
Area objectives: Knowledge AIS presentation status and symbols of AIS; Describe characteristics of 
presentation of AIS data, and how to analyse and interpret AIS information. 
 
4.1  Knowledge: 
                  .1      AIS presentation status 
· AIS ON/OFF 
· Filtering of AIS sleeping targets 
· Automatic activation of AIS targets 
· CPA/TCPA alarm 
· Lost Target alarm 
· Target association 
                  .2       Symbols of AIS targets data and of Radar/ARPA targets data 
                  .3      Operational alarms and indications of AIS information 
 
4.2   Describe: 
                 .1      AIS display characteristics 
                 .2      AIS data presenting on a MKD AIS 
                 .3      The correct interpretation of the displayed data 
                 .4      Recognizing dangerous targets and assessing safety situations 
   .5      Distinguishing target data from AIS or Radar/ARPA or from a combination of these two. 
                 .6      Distinguishing incomplete received AIS information 
                 .7      monitoring own ships AIS data on request 
                 .8      AIS and Radar automatic target association function and criteria of target association 
                 .9      Correlation of AIS and Radar/ARPA information 
                .10     Determination of any substantial differences of information from both AIS and Radar 
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5.   Sensors 
 
Area objectives: Describe the performance limits of sensors and assess their impact on the safe use of 
AIS 
 
5.1   Explain: 
.1      The performance limits concerning availability, accuracy and integrity of all 
navigational sensors connected to AIS (as defined in Figure 5-1) 
.2     Awareness of a deterioration in sensor performance 
                 .3     Analysis and interpretation of failure indication of sensors 
 
6.   Roles of AIS 
 
Area objectives: Describe the roles that AIS acts in IBS and their impacts on safety; Explain the 
potential risks of using AIS to ships 
 
6.1   Describe: 
                  .1    AIS-an additional source for navigational information  
                  .2      AIS not replacing but supporting navigational systems 
                  .3      No negative impact on responsibility in COLREGS when using AIS 
 
6.2   Explain: 
                 .1       A potential risk of data inaccuracy in inherent in AIS 
                 .2       Errors/inaccuracies of sensors’ data 
                 .3       Risks of over-reliance on AIS 
                 .4       The necessity of crosschecking of information in a navigational watch 
                 .5       Assessment of integrity of the system and all data at all times 
 
7.   Shore-based AIS application 
 
Area objectives: Describe further AIS application on shore and its impact on ship safety. 
 
7.1   Describe: 
.1       Text message sent by VTS centers 
.2       (D)GNSS corrections 
.3       Functionality of AIS in SAR operation and a long range applications 
.4       AIDs to navigation 
.5       Use of AIS in ship reporting and routeing 
  .6       A land-based AIS system and Common Baltic Sea Monitoring System 
                 .7       AIS information for anti-terrorist purpose 
 
 
 
Table 7-1 A syllabus of AIS training 
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Appendix I    
An Overview of AIS 
 
 
Figure 2 - AIS Components 
(Source: IMO, 2002) 
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Appendix II   
 
Technical Description of AIS1 
 
1, AIS operates primarily on two dedicated VHF channels (AIS1 - 161,975 MHz and 
AIS2 - 162,025 MHz). Where these channels are not available regionally, the AIS is 
capable of automatically switching to alternate designated channels. 
 
2, The required ship reporting capacity according to the IMO performance standard 
amounts to a minimum of 2000 time slots per minute (see figure 1). The ITU 
Technical Standard for the Universal AIS provides 4500 time slots per minute. The 
broadcast mode is based on a principle called (S)TDMA (Self-organized Time 
Division Multiple Access) that allows the system to be overloaded by 400 to 500% 
and still provide nearly 100% throughput for ships closer than 8 to 10 NM to each 
other in a ship-to-ship mode. In the event of system overload, only targets far away 
will be subject to drop-out in order to give preference to targets close by that are a 
primary concern for ship-to-ship operation of AIS. In practice, the capacity of the 
system is unlimited, allowing for a great number of ships to be accommodated at the 
same time.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Principles of TDMA 
                                                 
1 Derived from IMO Resolution A.917 (22) 
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Appendix III-1 
 
AIS 
IMO 4 ITU 4 
 IEC WIP ECDIS  IMO  4                     IEC 4* 
ARPA  IMO 4  
                 IEC 4* 
RADAR  IMO 4  
                       IEC 4* 
ECS RTCM SC 109 Standards WIP* 
INS IMO 4 
          IEC WIP*   
4 = Approved standard & spec 
* =  AIS requirements TBD 
WIP = Work in Progress 
MIN DISPLAY 
& HMI 
PILOT CARRY-ABOARD 
  (Portable Piloting Unit) 
Remote    or 
                Integrated 
Tactical Situation  
Display (optional) 
AIS DISPLAY OPTIONS 
CONNING/ MANUEVERING DISPLAY 
NEMA 2000 
Interface 
(Source: Ross, 2004)
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Appendix  III-2   
AIS ELEMENTS 
 
Display                                                       Assemble                                            Communication   
ECDIS ECS 
ARPA Laptop 
Gathers vessel movement 
information and assembles 
it into an AIS compliant  
data sentence. 
Displays incoming  
vessel information on  
a suitable device 
GPS/ 
DGPS 
HDG 
COG 
Speed 
Initiates and controls the  
flow of data sentences  
between participating units 
(Source: Ross, 2004)
OOW 
input 
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Appendix IV  
 
Comparison of AIS- and Radar-based information  
 
 
 
 
(Source: Berking & Pettersson, 2004) 
Functions Radar / ARPA AIS AIS Exemple / Comment 
ID and static data    
 - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
· MMSI 
· Call sign and name 
· IMO number 
· Length and beam 
· Type of ship 
· GNSS antenna 
location 
 
Dynamic data    
Position  
-      Absolute 
- Relative 
- Accuracy 
 
- 
X 
Ship: < 30 m 
VTS: < 20 m 
 
X 
- 
1-5 m 
1-5 m 
With 
· Time stamp  
· Accuracy indication  
· Integrity status 
Speed 
- SOG / COG 
- STW / CTW 
 
 
X, if SOG input  
X (ambiguous value), if STW 
input 
 
X 
- 
 
 
 
Heading replaces CTW 
Heading - X From target’s gyro 
 
ROT - X 
10°/min flag 
Transmitted if available; or 
heading-based 
Nav. status - X “Underway by engine”; “at 
anchor”; “moored” 
CPA /TCPA X 
Distance/bearing-based 
X 
D/GNSS-based 
 
Rudder - - Intendedly not!  
Voyage related data    
Draught - X  
Cargo - X  
Destination; ETA - X  
Route plan - (x) Master’s discretion  
Targets and symbols    
Basic information Raw radar Sleeping target  
More information Acquired target (vector) Activated target 
(Vector, heading, ROT flag) 
 
Detailed information Selected target data display  Selected target  
Risk Dangerous target Dangerous target  
 Lost target  Lost target  
Essentials    
Aspect (CTW values only) X Via headings 
Ship autonomous  X - GNSS dependent 
Target display  Radar-conspicious target AIS-equipped target  
Manoeuvre detection 30 – 90 sec 5- 10 sec AIS misses very unlikely 
Display  Radar Radar; ECDIS; AIS only  
Data fusion With AIS With radar  
Wind, weather - X Via binary messages  
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Appendix  V    
Relationship Between IBS and INS 
IBS 
INS C        
 
 
        INS B 
                                  INS A 
Heading 
Speed Position 
“Integrity 
Monitoring”  
Consistent common 
referencing system 
Autopilot; 
Heading &  
Track Control 
Communications; 
MI control; 
Loading;  
Safety & Security; 
Management of 
Operation 
Chart/ECS/ECDIS;  
Radar/ARPA; 
AIS;Depth 
(Source: STN ATLAS, 2004)
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Appendix VI  
 
Lessons to Learn from the Royal Majesty’s Grounding 
 
1. Over-reliance on integrated navigation system led to grounding of cruise vessel 
This summary is based on a report issued earlier in the year by the US National 
Transportation Safety Board. It is included here with their kind permission. 
 
On the evening of 10 June 1995, the Panamanian registered passenger vessel 
ROYAL MAJESTY grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of 
Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. The vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en 
route from St Georges, Bermuda, to Boston, Massachusetts. 
 
About an hour after leaving St Georges the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
antenna cable became partly disconnected causing the GPS to switch to dead 
reckoning mode. Nobody noticed. The autopilot continued to react to the information 
derived from the GPS. Thus the set of the vessel, caused by wind, current and sea 
conditions, was not detected and allowed for by the system. The fault with the GPS, 
and the fact that the vessel was not in the position indicated by the integrated bridge 
navigational system, remained unnoticed by the watch officers during the 34 hours 
prior to the grounding. 
 
Initial attempts to re-float the vessel were unsuccessful while deteriorating weather 
and sea conditions prevented the evacuation of passengers and crew. 
On 11 June, ROYAL MAJESTY was re-floated with the aid of five tugs. Initial 
damage surveys revealed deformation of the vessel's double bottom. However, no 
penetration or cracking of the hull was detected, and no fuel oil had been spilled. The 
US Coast Guard gave the vessel permission to proceed to Boston to disembark the 
passengers. She arrived there safely on 12 June. 
Although there were no injuries as a result of this accident, the costs of repairs to the 
vessel and lost revenue were estimated at about US $7 million. 
 
2 The Lessons 
 
This was a well-found vessel with fully qualified and experienced bridge watch 
keepers. Like most, if not all, passenger liners the ROYAL MAJESTY was equipped 
with modern navigational aids including GPS, which is capable of determining a 
vessel's position with great accuracy. 
(1) Despite their experience and qualifications the watch keepers remained 
unaware of the increasing deviation from the planned track in the 34-hour 
period after leaving Bermuda. 
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Appendix VII  
 
The principle of UAIS STDMA1 
 
1. The Equipment of AIS 
 
The shipboard and shore station equipment consists of a box containing two (one as a 
reserve back up) fully synthesized VHF transmitter and receiver units capable of 
operating on any frequency within the marine band (136 -174 MHz). Two VHF 
channels within this band have been allocated for intership transponder use by the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) namely AIS1 (161.975Mhz) and 
AIS2 (162.025Mhz). If these become overloaded or are allocated to alternative usage 
within any area then the system will be switchable to another available channel 
within the marine band. The unit also contains a GPS receiver and a computer. 
 
2. Basic Principle of Operation 
 
Each station transmits data in pulses on the VHF frequency and any station within 
VHF range will be able to receive the information and display it either on the radar, 
ECDIS or a dedicated display. The system can therefore be used for ship to ship and 
ship to shore (4S) identification and transfer of data. Using the two channels the 
system is designed to provide about 45002 slots per minute for transmission of 
information "blocks". Depending on the information required a ship will require 
more than one slot to transmit the relevant information. There are four types of 
information "block". 
                                                 
1 This article is derived from AIS-More Discussion Required? By Baker, J.C. that was published in 
Seaways, July 2000.  
 
2 The author mentioned that 4,500 slots per minute appears more than adequate for even the busiest 
waterway but the industry’s ambitious plans for it to relay chunks of data about each vessel will eat 
into that capacity. 
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(1) Static: this will probably consist of Name, Callsign, IMO & MMSI 
numbers, Length& Draft. The information will be repeated about 
every 6 minutes.  
(2) Dynamic3: GPS Position, Course and Speed made well, Gyro heading 
and Rate of Turn. Information is updated every time slot or on 
request.  
(3) Voyage related: Ship type, Cargo, Destination, ETA etc. Repeated 
every 6 minutes or updated as required. 
(4) Short Messages: Safety related transmitted as required. 
 
The system will operate in 3 different modes: 
 
(1) Autonomous and Continuous 
When a vessel is at sea it will be operating in this mode and will transmit basic static 
and dynamic data, which can be displayed and read by other stations within VHF 
range. The transponder monitors other transmissions and transmits when there is a 
clear slot between other transmissions.  
 
(2) Assigned mode 
Upon entering a VTS area the transmissions will be automatically controlled by the 
shore base station and assigned a slot to link in with other traffic. Ship to shore 
transmissions will normally take place on a dedicated port frequency different from 
the AIS 1 & 2 intership frequencies. When a ship enters a port area it will be 
requested to switch AIS operation to that channel by the polling mode. 
 
(3) Polled or Controlled mode 
The shore station automatically interrogates the other station and requests specific 
information and advises the port working frequency to be worked. Operation in this 
                                                 
3 There is currently no requirement for vessels to carry GPS or DGPS. As the Author understands it 
the GPS receiver to be incorporated into the AIS unit will be of low grade with the primary function 
of controlling the timer of the unit. 
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mode may possibly take place on Channel 70 in the form of a DSC short message in 
order not to conflict with the other modes. 
 
3. Practical Operation 
 
(1) Ship to Ship  
The system displays the static and dynamic information of other shipping within 
VHF range and the advantage of the system is that it will work in heavy clutter and 
radar shadow sectors such as behind a headland. Interestingly, opinions of the 
serving officers present at the seminar differed as to the merits of positive 
identification of shipping. The short sea traders could see distinct advantages in 
being able to identify the "Port Hand Charlie" whereas a deep-sea officer was of the 
opinion that what was required was not more excuses for VHF conversations but for 
shipping to obey the COLREGS. The point was also raised that the existing 
COLREGS made no provision for VHF conversations! There was however a general 
consensus of opinion that with their identity being beamed out continuously watch-
keepers would tend to be more vigilant! 
 
(2) Ship to Shore  
The advantages here are more obvious since AIS will remove the need for vessels to 
report to shore stations with their details or to update their position passing reporting 
points. VHF conversations will thus be minimized. The promoters of the system 
claim that it will to be able to handle around 400 ships. The dynamic information 
received is expected to provide sufficient information for a more positive interaction 
between a VTS centre and shipping and thus reduce the requirement for compulsory 
pilotage. The system could also be used to re-transmit VTS radar positions of vessels 
not fitted with AIS to shipping to enable these to be displayed on a vessel's ECDIS or 
pilot laptop display4.  
                                                 
4 Currently it is not possible for this VTS information to be received and displayed as vectors, i.e. a 
moving vessel will appear as a spot that will jump each time the signal is transmitted. 
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General causal factors in the grounding include: 
 
· Over-reliance by watch keeping officers on the automated features of the 
integrated bridge system;  
· Inadequate training in the technical capabilities and limitations of the 
integrated bridge system;  
· Poor navigational watch keeping practices in general.  
 
Specific factors include: 
 
· The routing of the GPS antenna cable, which made it vulnerable to damage;  
· The fact that the echo sounder alarm had been set to zero depth;  
· Deficient monitoring of the status of the GPS;  
· No cross-checking of the GPS derived positions by watch keepers;  
· Sole reliance on the position-fix alarm for warning of deviation from the 
vessel's intended track;  
· The configuration of the integrated bridge system, which neither 
recognised nor allowed for the fact that the GPS had switched to dead 
reckoning mode. Its design did not adequately incorporate human factors 
engineering;  
· The remoteness of the GPS receiver, and the short duration of the aural 
alarm which sounds when switched to the dead reckoning mode, 
contributed to the failure of the watch keepers to notice the change.  
 
(2) MAIB Comment. Modern navigation aids can fail; sometimes without 
being noticed by the operator. A fundamental rule of safe navigation is to 
always check the primary method of navigation by an independent source. 
Radio aids, astro-navigation, visual fixing and use of the echo sounder are 
all available to the conscientious navigator. Special care is needed when 
making a landfall. 
 
 
( MAIB, 1997) 
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Appendix VIII 
AIS Information Display on PC Screen 
Ship Is Following The Constant-Radius Turning 
Own Ship’s 
Info.: 
XTE Bargraph 
Ship’s Channel 
& Channel 
Width 
L/R Distance  
Dist. to next 
event 
Pos, Course, 
Speed 
DGPS status  
Other Ship’s 
Info.: 
Vessel Name, 
ID 
Position 
Course 
Speed 
DGPS status  
VHF AIS 
status  
Dimensions  
Closing info. 
(Source: Ross, 2004) 
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Appendix IX 
 
AIS – Minimum Keyboard Display  
(Source: Berking, 2004) 
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Appendix X 
 
 
 
AIS and Radar Data Association  
 
 
(Source: SAM 1000, 2004) 
 
Notes: 
• An AIS targets will be displayed by switching the AIS button to 
“ON”. 
• As default the Sleeping Target symbol will be displayed. For 
more information, the target has to be activated. 
• Sub menus can be selected for additional information. 
• Switching AIS button to “OFF”, only activated targets will be 
displayed to avoid clutter on the PPI and information overload. 
 
